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A B S T R A C T
In this work we present novel security services in an “Infrastructure-
as-a-Service” (IaaS) cloud computing scenario. The services can be
offered by a cloud provider to customers according to a “Security-
as-a-Service” (SECaaS) business model. The services operate trans-
parently and benefit from techniques like Virtual Machine (VM) live
cloning, VM introspection and VM storage forensics. They use unique
strategies in order to analyze information or manipulate data which
has been retrieved from a transparent hypervisor perspective and
they run in a tamper-resistant environment separated from the sys-
tems of the cloud customers. We propose three different security
services which detect attacks against the VMs of customers. They
identify spreading malicious software, they detect phishing attacks
executed with hitherto unknown spoofed web pages and they detect
“Man-in-the-Browser” attacks. We propose two services which pre-
cisely analyze ongoing attacks as well as deceive attackers by dynam-
ically extracting or redirecting them into honeypot-like environments.
Furthermore, we propose two services which operate in a pro-active
fashion by dynamically isolating sensitive data or by continuously
implementing custom-made security settings.
iii
Z U S A M M E N FA S S U N G
In dieser Arbeit präsentieren wir neuartige Sicherheitsdienste in ei-
nem “Infrastructure-as-a-Service” (IaaS) Cloud Computing Szenario.
Ein Cloud-Provider kann Kunden die Dienste gemäß eines “Security-
as-a-Service (SECaaS)” Business-Models anbieten. Die Dienste arbei-
ten transparent und profitieren von Techniken wie Virtual Machine
(VM) Live Cloning, VM Introspection und VM Storage Forensics. Sie
nutzen einzigartige Strategien, um Informationen zu analysieren oder
Daten zu manipulieren, die aus einer transparenten Hypervisor-Per-
spektive gewonnen wurden und sie laufen in einer manipulations-
sicheren Umgebung, abgetrennt von den Systemen der Cloud-Kun-
den. Wir stellen drei verschiedene Sicherheitsdienste vor, die Angriffe
auf die VMs von Kunden erkennen. Sie identifizieren sich ausbrei-
tende bösartige Software, sie erkennen Phishing-Angriffe durchge-
führt mit bisher unbekannten nachgeahmten Webseiten und sie erken-
nen “Man-in-the-Browser” Angriffe. Wir stellen zwei Dienste vor, die
präzise laufende Angriffe analysieren und Angreifer täuschen, indem
sie diese dynamisch in isolierte Honeypot-ähnliche Umgebungen ex-
trahieren oder umleiten. Darüber hinaus stellen wir zwei Sicherheits-
dienste vor, die auf eine pro-aktive Weise arbeiten, indem sie dy-
namisch sensible Daten isolieren oder kontinuierlich maßgefertigte
Sicherheitseinstellungen umsetzen.
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1
I N T R O D U C T I O N
1.1 the rise of cloud computing
In recent years, cloud computing became an IT-standard in the busi-
ness world and the cloud is increasingly used in private life as well.
While in private use cases people mostly use the cloud to backup
and synchronize their data between different devices, companies out-
source data as well as entire processes to cloud computing providers.
This allows to save costs because the companies do not need to main-
tain an own hardware infrastructure nor do they need to recruit IT-
specialists for administrative purposes.
However, the buzzword “cloud computing” often seems to be erro-
neously taken as a term which describes a technology. In particular,
cloud computing is not a technology itself, rather it is a business
model which has recently been facilitated by certain advances in vari-
ous different technologies. These advances are in hardware, for exam-
ple in the field of transmission technologies which allow higher and
unlimited bandwidths for relatively low costs and in the field of pro-
cessor technologies which became very efficient. Furthermore, these
advances are also in software, especially in the field of virtualization
technologies which allow to share physical computing resources be-
tween different software systems on a highly scalable, customizable
and flexible way.
In general, the business value of cloud computing can be found in
providing remote computing resources “as a Service” which means
they are provided on demand and according to the principle of “pay-
per-use”. Established cloud business models are Infrastructure-as-a-
Service (IaaS) giving customers privileged access to operating sys-
tems running in virtual machines, Platform-as-a-Service (PaaS) giv-
ing customers access to prepared and well-defined remote software
appliances or Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) only giving customers ac-
cess to specific applications that are hosted in the cloud. All these
models provide high scalability and usability to customers as well as
fine-grained billing methods and monitoring of costs.
In the foreseeable future, mobile clients in the form of lightweight
notebooks, netbooks, readers, tablets and smartphones will continue
to replace traditional computer systems and they will strongly de-
pend on the scalable remote cloud computing resources to store and
synchronize data or to use the cloud’s computing power.
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1.2 security issues in cloud computing
Unfortunately, in contrast to all the economic advantages which cloud
computing introduced, security incidents occur on a daily basis and
often on a large scale.
Foremost, the core components of cloud computing are standard
network protocols and popular software components. Accordingly,
the cloud is vulnerable against all attacks against which traditional
computer networks are vulnerable as well. For example, program-
ming flaws in the memory management can be found, sometimes
even introduced by self-made software created by the customers in an
IaaS cloud scenario [70]. The security impact of these vulnerabilities
can be higher in the context of cloud computing because once a new
vulnerability has been revealed, it can be usually exploited on a larger
scale since the cloud is often a somewhat homogenous software envi-
ronment. Especially, misconfigurations or frivolously deployed secu-
rity settings by unaware customers who maintain privileges on cloud
resources are a major reason for security incidents [78]. Often, cloud
customers do not have the expertise to maintain complex distributed
IT-systems especially considering security management and incident
response.
However, besides the recurring software vulnerabilities, cloud com-
puting also introduces new security issues which did not occur in
traditional computer networks. For example, the world-wide distri-
bution of data centers maintained by single providers and certain
established (live) migration software techniques used by the cloud
providers for optimization or incident response makes it difficult
for customers to investigate the actual physical location of their out-
sourced processes which again makes it difficult to rely on nation-
ally bound legislation [12]. Furthermore, the sharing of hardware re-
sources with the help of software virtualization technologies enables
the opportunity to mount certain side-channel attacks. For example,
memory-based side-channel attacks have been proposed which can
be used to retrieve sensitive information like encryption keys from op-
erating systems of other customers [96]. Also, new privacy concerns
occur, since when customers outsource data or their IT-processes to
the cloud, they also sacrifice their control and they need to trust previ-
ously arranged agreements. In this context, the cloud provider’s em-
ployees, (such as the server administrators) gain profound insights
and unforeseen power [40]. Last but not least, based on the fact that
everyone who is willing to pay can gain access to the cloud and its re-
sources, attacks and misuse by malicious customers comes into play.
2
1.3 security opportunities introduced by the cloud
Fortunately, with the help of the underlying technologies used in
cloud computing, existing security architectures can be improved and
adapted to the new threats. Additionally, even novel security architec-
tures can be developed and implemented.
Traditional security technologies can be adapted to the new prop-
erties of a cloud computing scenario and to the underlying software
virtualization. For example, Trusted Computing (TC) techniques and
protocols can be adapted and integrated into virtualization technolo-
gies ([30], [10]) or logging and monitoring techniques can be adapted
by exploiting new sources of information in the cloud [92].
In addition, novel security architectures can be developed which
benefit from the flexibility of the cloud’s underlying software vir-
tualization technologies, from the large scale of a cloud computing
network or from an extensive new transparent monitoring perspec-
tive. For example, precise information about ongoing events can be
retrieved through virtualization and this information can rapidly be
analyzed and evaluated with the help of scalable cloud computing
resources.
Furthermore, the network topology of the virtualized cloud net-
work can be quickly adapted to new threats and the virtualized sys-
tems can be flexibly migrated [3], dynamically scaled, cloned [81] or
even restored from (live) snapshots which is an ideal facility for secu-
rity investigations or incident response. The novel security architec-
tures can operate isolated and tamper-resistant in an own virtualized
system separated from the customers’ systems while being still able
to monitor other virtualized systems located on the same physical
hardware. These security architectures can benefit from a transparent
perspective and even retrieve information of target running systems
which traditional monitoring systems could not retrieve. The diffi-
culty in building these novel cloud security architectures is mostly
due to the interpretation of the data retrieved from a broad and trans-
parent perspective.
1.4 the infrastructure-as-a-service business model
In this work, we design, implement and evaluate different novel se-
curity architectures for a cloud provider that offers cloud comput-
ing resources according to the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) busi-
ness model. The IaaS business model allows customers to get full
on demand privileged access to operating systems installed in vir-
tual machines (VMs) which are hosted on the hardware of a cloud
provider. Customers can install new software, remove software and
adapt all the available configuration settings. In the most cases, the
customers can select VMs out of different performance classes. For
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example, there are VM classes which are optimized for high perfor-
mance computing with a lot of CPU power and a lot of memory, there
are VM classes which are optimized for databases with large storage
resources or there are VM classes which are optimized for scientific
GPU computations.
A cloud provider offering IaaS is illustrated in Figure 1. Different
customers get remote access to the cloud resources by accessing and
using operating systems running in separated VMs hosted on the
cloud provider’s hardware. For the customers, costs incur depending
on the time their VMs are hosted and depending on the selected VM
class. Accounts and the resources of an IaaS cloud can be managed by
a cloud administrator with the help of cloud management software,
for example Openstack1 or Eucalyptus2.
Figure 1: An Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud provider offering ac-
cess to remote operating systems to different customers.
Today, the leading cloud provider using an IaaS business model is
Amazon with its Elastic Computing Cloud3. The IaaS business model
is very successful, mostly because a cloud provider can offer cheap
prices since optimized hardware can be effectively shared between
different customers with the help of software virtualization. This way,
the full hardware capacity can be continuously used. Furthermore,
cloud providers can benefit from modern, centralized, large-scaled
and optimized data centers.
1.5 security-as-a-service in cloud computing
In the following chapters, we present the design, the implementation
and the evaluation of several different novel security architectures
for an IaaS cloud which make use of the underlying technologies
and which can be offered by a cloud provider to its customers. In
1 https://www.openstack.org/
2 https://www.eucalyptus.com/
3 https://aws.amazon.com/ec2/
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particular, the proposed security architectures can be assigned to the
“Security-as-a-Service” (SECaaS) business model which has lately be-
come popular in the context of cloud computing.
There are various different definitions of SECaaS on the Internet.
However, these definitions usually share certain core properties. Based
on our investigations, security architectures which can be provided as
a cloud service typically share three major features:
• The cloud security services are generic and support popular
and widely distributed software components, platforms and dif-
ferent operating systems.
• The cloud security services are tamper-resistant and operate in
a separated virtualized system isolated from the systems of the
customers and isolated from the network used by them.
• The cloud security services only use transparent techniques to
retrieve information about the systems of the customers. Cus-
tomers do not need to install or configure any security software
on their systems. The operations of the security services do not
interrupt the work-flow of the systems of the customers nor
they are detectable from their perspective.
Customers can select and enable specific security services on a pay-
per-use basis, for example on the cloud provider’s web page.
In this work, we present different novel security services (SECaaS),
which can transparently detect, analyze and mitigate attacks against
the systems of the IaaS cloud customers.
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2
U S E D T E C H N I Q U E S A N D R E L AT E D W O R K
2.1 tamper-resistance and transparency
As previously mentioned, we present novel security services for cloud
computing which follow the paradigm of SECaaS (Section 1.5). These
security services run isolated, tamper-resistant and retrieve informa-
tion only transparently. In order to understand the concept of tamper-
resistance and transparency in a computer security scenario, we briefly
show a firewall architecture called “SystemWall” [11] that is realized
with the help of a hardware extension. The SystemWall is no cloud
security service nor it is based on virtualization technologies. How-
ever, it can be perfectly used to explain the terms tamper-resistance
and transparency.
Many tamper-resistant and transparent security architectures use
hardware expansions like a special trusted processor booting the mi-
cro kernel of the system [79] or particular co-processors only used for
monitoring [39] or cryptography [2]. For example, Yashiro et al. [89]
proposed to use a tamper-resistant chip which executes the sensitive
operations in an access control scenario on a file system. In partic-
ular, tamper-resistant architectures are often used in embedded de-
vices [69].
In the architecture for the SystemWall, we exploit Direct Memory
Access (DMA) to create a firewall-like system which enables to trans-
parently analyze the volatile memory of a system from an isolated
perspective. DMA is part of the Peripheral Component Interconnect
(PCI) specification which allows hardware devices to bypass the Cen-
tral Processing Unit (CPU) and directly access the volatile system
memory. This brings the advantage that a system’s CPU can perform
other useful tasks while DMA operations are in progress and it can ac-
celerate certain hardware tasks. DMA has been in the focus of security
researchers for some years, mostly because it easily allows to read the
memory of a system through certain external interfaces while bypass-
ing the security mechanisms of an operating system – and without
any interruptions. In particular, DMA can be exploited by attackers
to dump the volatile memory of unattended running systems through
an external bus like for example ExpressCard, FireWire or Thunder-
bolt. Afterwards, the raw memory dump can be investigated using
advanced forensic techniques in order to extract passwords, keys or
other sensitive information. However, DMA can also be used to in-
crease the security of a system and mitigate attacks. In particular,
DMA can be used to transparently read the memory contents via an
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external hardware device in a tamper-resistant perspective isolated
from potential malicious software running on the target system. The
contents can then be analyzed for malicious programs or for mali-
cious established network connections – as the SystemWall does. The
SystemWall can be deployed between a system and the Internet, and
intercept all packets traveling from and to the target system. Placing
the SystemWall between the Internet and the target system allows, for
example, to delay network packets going to or from the target system
while the target system’s memory can be transparently analyzed in
order to validate that the source of a network packet is legitimate and
a non-malicious application. During this procedure, the SystemWall
remains isolated and undetected. Figure 2 illustrates the architecture.
Figure 2: The SystemWall deployed as tamper-resistant and transparent de-
vice which analyzes a system’s volatile memory and regulates its
network traffic.
We assume that a transparent hardware-based memory analysis
mechanism, such as through a dedicated PCIe expansion card, can-
not be compromised by malicious software as it is separate from the
target system. Furthermore, malicious software that manipulates the
target operating system can be easily detected.
The SystemWall architecture is a nice example of how a tamper-
resistant and transparent security architecture can look like. How-
ever, in addition to the advantages which tamper-resistance and trans-
parency introduce, certain new difficulties arise. In particular, imple-
mentation is more difficult and sophisticated localization and tracing
techniques are required to rapidly retrieve useful information from
the raw data read in this perspective. Special strategies are needed
which can make use out of the collected information. Furthermore,
the information retrieved this way is often lagging behind the oc-
curred events. If attacks should be prevented – and not only detected
– other complementary protection mechanisms are required. For ex-
ample, in the SystemWall scenario, new outgoing connections are de-
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layed for a small period of time until the transparent analysis of the
target system’s volatile memory is finished.
In this section, we briefly introduced an isolated firewall device
called SystemWall in order to explain the terms tamper-resistance and
transparency in a computer security scenario. In the next chapters, we
again focus on the development and evaluation of security services
for an IaaS cloud computing scenario (Section 1.4). In this context,
tamper-resistance and transparency is enabled with the help of soft-
ware virtualization technologies instead of hardware extensions.
2.2 virtualization with the xen hypervisor
In the scenario used in this work, we assume a cloud provider offer-
ing access to operating systems running in Virtual Machines (VMs)
based on the Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) business model. In this
scenario, multiple VMs of different customers run co-located on the
same physical hardware and share hardware resources with the help
of software virtualization technologies. Virtualization creates VMs,
each VM emulates a stand-alone and isolated hardware container for
an operating system. In general, virtualization is enabled with the
help of a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM), also called hypervisor. A
hypervisor is a software component managing the sharing of comput-
ing resources and the isolation of multiple systems into VMs.
In this work, we use the Xen hypervisor ([8], [55]) which is a mod-
ern type-1 or “bare-metal” hypervisor. The Xen hypervisor runs di-
rectly on the hardware and creates VMs which run on a level above
the hypervisor software. There are also other hypervisor architectures
in which the hypervisor runs within an operating system (type-2 hy-
pervisor) or there are hybrid hypervisor architectures1,2. In this con-
text, the Linux Kernel-based Virtual Machine [77] (KVM3) is quite
popular. We use the Xen hypervisor because it is open source soft-
ware4 and popular in academia as well as in industry. However, the
proposed security services explained and evaluated in this work can
also run with other hypervisor software.
The Xen hypervisor offers two ways in which VMs can be deployed:
Para-virtualization requires certain modifications in the operating sys-
tems in order to support special hypercalls for communication be-
tween the hypervisor and the operating system as extensions to the
systemcalls. This way, a higher performance can be achieved, because
the hardware devices can be scheduled and no hardware platform
needs to be emulated for a VM. However, we use the second type of
virtualization offered by Xen which is called Hardware Virtual Ma-
1 VMware vSphere (http://www.vmware.com/)
2 VirtualBox (https://www.virtualbox.org/)
3 Kernel-based Virtual Machine (http://www.linux-kvm.org/)
4 The Xen project (http://www.xen.org/)
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chine (HVM) or just “full-virtualization” [94]. In this context, full
virtualization means that all attached hardware devices a VM uses
are emulated. This brings the advantage that no modifications on the
VM’s operating system are required. Even a virtual BIOS is created for
each VM. With this method, the operating system itself is unaware of
being located and run in a VM. This allows to support proprietary op-
erating systems, for example Windows. The Xen hypervisor relies on
Qemu [9] to emulate a hardware setup for each VM that is deployed
in HVM mode. Qemu is an open source machine emulator5. For the
HVM mode, the used physical CPU needs to support an extended
set of instructions called Virtual Machine Extensions (VMX) which
basically allows to run the hypervisor code separated in a special
root-operation mode while the VMs can run in non-root-operation
mode. Using these extended instructions is called Hardware-assisted
virtualization (Intel VT-x and AMD-V) and supported by CPUs of re-
cent generations. A typical Xen hypervisor setup with several VMs
(HVM) is illustrated in Figure 3.
Figure 3: A Xen hypervisor setup with multiple virtual machines sharing a
physical hardware platform.
In the Xen architecture, a VM called “dom0” (domain-0) is always
present: It creates or destroys emulated devices and controls and
maintains administrative privileges on the underlying Xen hypervi-
sor. For example, the system running in dom0 is used by an adminis-
trator to start, scale or terminate guest VMs called “domU” (domain-
User) which are assigned to the cloud customers in the IaaS business
model (Section 1.4). The VMs share the CPU of the hardware with
the help of Xen’s scheduler, they share the available volatile memory
with the help of Xen’s memory management unit (MMU) and they
share the storage, network devices and other available I/O devices.
For example, the VMs can access the network through a virtualized
bridge deployed and managed by Xen through virtualized network
devices assigned to each VM.
5 http://www.qemu.org/
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2.3 scalability, live migration and live cloning
In order to enable the appreciated “pay-per-use” business model of
cloud computing, the cloud provides a high level of scalability and
flexibility. Especially in an IaaS cloud computing scenario, the concept
of VMs allows to execute certain flexible operations which are not
available in traditional computer networks that do not run virtualized
systems. These operations are used for administrative tasks, but they
can also be used for security purposes.
For example, the performance of VMs can be dynamically scaled
during run-time, just by changing the underlying emulated hardware.
This way, the size of the volatile memory can be increased or de-
creased while the operating system continuously runs. The VM’s stor-
age, the assigned virtual CPU (vCPU) units or any other emulated
hardware device can be changed as well. In a Xen hypervisor setup
(Section 2.2), the dynamic balancing of the volatile memory is quite
popular and called “memory ballooning” [8]. Depending on executed
operations and required hardware resources, the memory size can be
dynamically changed and adapted.
Furthermore, a live snapshot of the current state of a VM and its
operating system can easily be created during run-time. This way, the
system can be restored from the snapshot at a later point in time. This
operation is especially interesting for backup purposes, but also for
security purposes, for example for incidence response [41].
Another interesting operation provided by virtualization technolo-
gies is live migration of VMs. Clark et al. [18] proposed the first live
migration algorithm for the Xen hypervisor in 2005. The proposed
strategy allows to migrate a running VM to a new physical hardware
platform with only very minimal and negligible downtime. No oper-
ations as well as no established network connections are interrupted.
Live migration is a useful tool for performance optimization tasks
within a local area network and for incident response. For example, if
hardware failures occur or if important upgrades need to be installed
which require a reboot of the hypervisor, the VMs can be flexibly
migrated to other hardware.
In a live migration procedure, the target VM’s storage is not relo-
cated, only the VM container defining its emulated hardware includ-
ing the VM’s volatile memory is transferred. In a cloud computing
setup, the storages of VMs are usually located on a centralized net-
work file system (NFS) which can be remotely accessed by the hy-
pervisor nodes. Figure 4 shows a Xen hypervisor setup enabling live
migration of VMs. The figure shows a customer VM with ID-2 being
live migrated from the physical computing node 1 to the physical
computing node N during run-time while the storage of the VM re-
mains on a storage server.
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A live migration procedure only causes a negligible downtime. Run-
ning processes, currently executed tasks as well as established net-
work connections of the live migrated VM are not interrupted. Fig-
ure 5 illustrates the six sequential steps performed by a Xen hypervi-
sor in a live migration procedure.
Figure 4: A Xen hypervisor setup which enables live migration of virtual
machines between different physical nodes.
Figure 5: Subsequent steps of a Xen VM live migration procedure.
In the first step (pre-migration), a new remote hardware node is
selected and the required resources are allocated. In the second step
(reservation), the new allocated resources are used to initialize a new
virtual container providing the required emulated hardware which
is used to deploy the VM. If this step was successful, the volatile
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memory of the target VM is copied from the source server to the
new server in the third step (iterative pre-copy step). The VM which
is about to be live migrated continuously runs and accordingly its
volatile memory gets modified depending on current tasks. After the
first copy process, the Xen hypervisor checks for modifications in the
VM’s volatile memory on the source server caused by the running VM
and potential operations executed during the first copy process. Iden-
tified so called “dirty” memory pages are again transferred to the
new server and the hypervisor again checks for new modifications.
This procedure is iteratively repeated until only a few memory pages
are not synchronous. In step four (stop and copy), the VM on the
source server is stopped and the remaining dirty memory pages are
transferred. This interruption is required to have a fully synchronous
memory copy on the new physical server. The VM’s operation is only
interrupted for a very small period of time in the range of millisec-
onds and currently running processes or established network connec-
tions are not affected. A logged-in remote user does not recognize
the interruption nor the live migration procedure in general. In step
five (commitment), the VM on the source server is terminated and
the hardware resources are freed. Finally, in step six (activation), the
VM on the new server is activated. During the live migration proce-
dure, the storage of the VM remains on the network file system (NFS)
and is not migrated. Network management is organized by the Xen
hypervisor and the migrated VM maintains the same IP address.
After integrating the live migration procedure into the Xen hyper-
visor, several work has been published which analyzed the perfor-
mance [45] or which improved the proposed algorithm, for example
by benefiting from data de-duplication techniques [95] or by using
a slowdown scheduling algorithm that decreases the CPU resources
of the migrating VM and accordingly reduces the dirtying page rate.
This approach lead to a faster live migration procedure [53]. Other
work analyzed the energy efficiency and the power consumption dur-
ing a live migration procedure [37] or optimized the energy consump-
tion by determining the best source and target physical server [87].
Furthermore, not only live migration in local area networks, but also
wide-area live migration was the target of research [14]. This topic
is especially interesting for cloud providers which operate in dis-
tributed data centers in different countries. Another interesting ap-
plication of live migration was proposed by Wang et al. [86] who re-
duced the complexity of network management tasks by introducing
moving routers.
The first security-related issue based on empirical exploitation of
the live migration procedure was presented in 2008. Oberheide et
al. [59] analyzed Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks by manipulating
the VM’s volatile memory during a live migration procedure with
the help of a malicious modified router. Furthermore, software bugs
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which lead to security problems have been discovered in the imple-
mentation of the Xen live migration algorithm and exploits can be
found on the Internet (e.g. CVE-2013-4356).
On the other hand, architectures based on live migration proce-
dures improving security have also been proposed. Ando et al. [3]
proposed a reliable web server protection system which uses live mi-
gration to adapt the internal network topology in case of Denial of
Service (DoS) attacks. In general, fast changes on the internal network
topology based on live migration is a promising approach targeting
security-related issues. For example, if a VM is the target of a DoS
attack, it can be migrated to physical hardware having better perfor-
mance. Zhang et al. [93] proposed a secured live migration architec-
ture with small performance degradation for VMM-enforced protec-
tion networks. Gondree et al. [31] proposed a data geo-location pro-
tocol which is a combination of network latency measurements and
provable data possession. Their solution helps to bind outsourced
data to specific geographical regions. Finally, also work of us can
be mentioned here, which deals with the early detection of a live
migration procedure in order to enforce location depending security
policies in time [12].
Since the introduction of live migration, also live cloning approaches
have been proposed for the Xen hypervisor inspired by the live mi-
gration algorithm [81]. While a live migration procedure relocates a
running VM to new hardware, live cloning creates a consistent replica
of a running VM and its operating system on other hardware or on
the same hardware. Basically, a live cloning procedure is similar to a
live migration procedure, except that the source VM is not destroyed
and the live cloning procedure needs to take particular care to ensure
correct resource management, especially if the cloned VM operates on
the same physical hardware. In particular, assigning a valid network-
ing configuration and communication issues in general are difficult
to handle. In this context, the clone should not use the same IP ad-
dress. Live cloning can be particularly interesting for various security
purposes. For example, as proposed by Lagar-Cavilla et al. [47], live
cloning can be used to fork a VM and its tasks or it can be used to
test and verify a new software configuration on a cloned VM before
it is finally deployed on the original VM [97].
The cloud provides high scalability based on procedures like VM
live migration or VM live cloning. These operations are enabled by
the underlying software virtualization technologies. These operations
lead to rethink and to revisit some ideas and implementations of
certain security architectures, for example in the field of incident re-
sponse or attack analysis. They can be used to improve existing se-
curity architectures and they can be used to develop new security
architectures for the cloud.
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2.4 virtual machine introspection
In this work, we often use the technique of Virtual Machine Introspec-
tion (VMI) which is facilitated by software virtualization. VMI allows
to transparently monitor the operation of a target VM by directly
reading the VM’s volatile memory pages during the VM’s operating
system runs. VMI operations are executed from an isolated and priv-
ileged position which is the administrative VM (dom0) in the Xen
setup hosted on the same physical hardware together with multiple
customer VMs. VMI is especially interesting for security purposes
like for example intrusion detection which can be implemented trans-
parently from a tamper-resistant perspective and unbeknownst to the
target VM being monitored.
In general, with the help of VMI, security architectures can be
moved to a separated and isolated VM while they can still operate
on the memory of co-resident VMs without being detected. In our
IaaS cloud computing scenario, the privileged Xen VM (dom0) can
be used to transparently monitor the volatile memory of VMs of the
customers. Figure 6 illustrates the perspective of VMI in the Xen hy-
pervisor setup (Section 2.2).
Figure 6: Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) used to transparently investi-
gate the volatile memory of a running Xen guest VM (domU) from
the perspective of the privileged VM (dom0).
The difficulty of VMI is due to the localization of the memory used
by a VM and the extraction of useful information from this continu-
ously changing volatile memory region. For example, processes op-
erating in a customer VM are constantly allocating or de-allocating
volatile memory pages depending on their tasks or depending on the
current work load.
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Figure 7 illustrates the virtual memory regions which use different
physical memory addresses that need to be investigated in order to
extract useful information from the virtual address space assigned to
a target process running in a customer VM. In general, the volatile
memory registers can be read by using physical memory addresses,
virtual addresses managed by the Memory Management Unit (MMU)
of the Xen hypervisor, or by virtual addresses managed by the Mem-
ory Management Unit of the installed operating system.
Figure 7: Different memory regions on a VM (domU) which can be trans-
parently investigated with the help of VMI.
Xen provides a function called xc_map_foreign_range() which can be
used to map memory of a VM to another VM. However, Xen supports
only to access the memory using low-level Machine Frame Numbers
(MFN) which are cumbersome to handle. Payne et al. [63] introduced
a VMI library6 for the Xen hypervisor which we often use in this work.
The VMI library provides a higher level of abstraction by translating
addresses. It can convert Physical Frame Numbers (PFN) to MFNs
with the help of Xen’s internal look-up table or it can convert virtual
addresses to the corresponding MFNs with the help of the target oper-
ating system’s internal page table. The library helps to find the correct
address ranges of the volatile memory regions of a target VM which
then can be precisely investigated with other methods. Furthermore,
the library provides a nice Python interface. In order to extract useful
information from the raw data stored in the volatile memory, the so
called “semantic gap” needs to be bridged. This means certain previ-
ous knowledge about the target VM’s operating system is required,
for example the location of the VM’s page table needs to be known
which can then be walked in order to retrieve further dynamically
stored data within a customer VM’s volatile memory [22].
Since VMI only enables to transparently access the raw volatile
memory regions of a co-resident VM, VMI techniques need to be com-
6 https://code.google.com/p/vmitools
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bined with advanced memory forensics techniques in order to extract
useful information [58]. Traditional memory forensic techniques are
basically used to analyze a dump of an operating system’s volatile
memory. However, in a hypervisor setup, we can tunnel advanced
memory forensic operations through VMI and execute them on a vir-
tualized system’s volatile memory during run-time. In this work, we
use the memory forensic framework Volatility7 which can be com-
bined with VMI for advanced memory analysis on running VMs.
Volatility provides OS-dependent modules that analyze raw mem-
ory data and extract information. For example, if a target VM runs
Windows and the static virtual address of the Windows kernel sym-
bol PsInitialSystemProcess and certain offsets are known, for example
defined in a profile, the combination of VMI and memory forensics
can be used to transparently extract a list of currently running pro-
cesses on the system. As another example, the tree structure of the
Windows virtual address descriptors [21] can be examined and the
memory pages assigned to a specific process can be located and in-
vestigated [52].
In general, some work has been done in the field of security archi-
tectures which use VMI techniques. Garfinkel et al. [29] presented an
IDS architecture maintaining the visibility of a host-based IDS, but
moving the IDS software to the outside of the monitored system in
order to increase attack resistance. Ibrahim et al. [38] proposed Cloud-
Sec, a fine-grained monitoring architecture which transparently moni-
tors the dynamic kernel data structures of operating systems running
in VMs. Azmandian et al. [6] built a transparent IDS which uses data
mining techniques in order to to extract and analyze useful data from
the raw memory regions. Crawford et al. [19] presented a transparent
security architecture which aims at identifying complex potentially
malicious actions of insiders by using VMI and an attacker taxonomy.
Fraser et al. [27] implemented an immunity architecture that can de-
tect kernel-modifying attacks on VMs with the help of integrity mea-
surements and autonomously repair the affected memory parts from
a transparent and tamper-resistant perspective during run-time. More
et al. [57] focused on the transparent detection and collection of mal-
ware samples. Recent research in the field of VMI focuses not only on
the transparent reading of a target VM’s volatile memory, but also on
writing to specific memory pages during run-time at certain specific
points in time. This way, even new procedures can be dynamically im-
planted and the execution can be enforced [33]. However, active VMI
needs to have very accurate and precise information about the target
system’s internals and operations in order to avoid inconsistent states
and crashes.
7 https://code.google.com/p/volatility/
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2.5 live virtual storage forensics
The hypervisor setup enables to transparently investigate the volatile
memory of a VM during its run-time from an isolated and tamper-
resistant perspective. Additionally, this perspective also allows the
examination of a VM’s virtualized storage – again transparently and
during run-time. Similar to the transparent investigation of the volatile
memory, certain previous information about the type and the struc-
ture of the target virtual storage is required in order to extract useful
information from the raw data. For example, the size of the installed
boot sector needs to be known as well as the type of the used file
system (for example NTFS, FAT32 or EXT3), the block size and the
sector size. Once this information is available (or can be retrieved
by testing), the file system of a target VM can be transparently exam-
ined and data can be located, read and modified. Figure 8 illustrates a
VM’s virtualized storage device stored on the physical storage device
on a server managed by the Xen hypervisor.
Figure 8: A virtual storage device assigned to a VM (domU) and hosted on
a physical storage device managed by the Xen hypervisor.
From the perspective of the administrative VM (dom0), the storage
of a customer VM is a raw data file from which data needs to be
precisely located before it can be read – no matter whether the target
VM to which this virtual storage is assigned is running or not. In this
work, we use the Sleuthkit8 storage forensic tools to examine a target
VMs storage. These tools help to investigate the file system and to
locate meta information of specific target files which again help to
locate the actual data of these files.
For example, the inode information (index node) which represents
a file system object on a journaling file system, (e.g. EXT3) can be
investigated and additional information like required permissions to
access this file or the last time the file was accessed can be retrieved.
Furthermore, the inode information can be used to find the corre-
8 http://www.sleuthkit.org/
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sponding blocks of the actual data on the raw storage. The block
information can in turn be used to compute the target file’s corre-
sponding sectors on which the target data is finally stored. Using this
information, the actual position of the data of a target file on the raw
storage can be calculated.
For example, for a known block number nblock which has been
retrieved from the file system’s meta information, for a known boot
sector size sboot, for a known block size sblock and for a known sec-
tor size ssec, the sector n which finally stores the data of the target
file can bey calculated with n = (nblock·sblock+sboot·ssec)ssec . Finally, the
data stored on the sector can be transparently read or even replaced
with new data just by directly overwriting the sectors out of the per-
spective of the administrative VM (dom0).
If data is transparently examined on a virtual storage during run-
time of the corresponding VM’s operating system, some special char-
acteristics need to be considered. An operating system is usually not
directly writing data to a hard drive because of performance issues.
Rather it buffers the data of the executed read or write operations in a
page cache in its volatile memory. This way, multiple write operations
to a hard drive are combined to single bigger write operations or data
which is frequently read is kept in the volatile memory and can be
accessed faster. However, this leads to the effect that data which is
written by a VM’s operating system to its storage can only be read
delayed from the perspective of the administrative VM (dom0).
There are certain parameters in an operating system which define
how long data is kept in the page cache or how much data is buffered
before it is finally written to the hard drive. For example, in Linux, pa-
rameters like the dirty_expire_centisecs or the dirty_writeback_centisecs
which can be set in /proc/sys/vm/ define caching properties of the file
system. Fortunately, these parameters are set to known values by de-
fault and they are usually not modified. Additionally, they are stored
in the operating system’s volatile memory and this way, they can be
transparently modified with the help of VMI (Section 2.4). In partic-
ular, delayed operations on the virtual storage need to be considered
when using transparent storage forensic techniques in our security
services. Furthermore, if we transparently overwrite the sectors of a
file in order to replace the stored data with new data, we need to take
into account which type of file system is used by the VM’s operating
system. The most popular file systems do not perform integrity mea-
surements on the data, however, there are file systems which compute
checksums and can this way reveal any modifications (for example
Oracle’s ZFS file system).
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3
T H E S I S O R G A N I Z AT I O N A N D C O N T R I B U T I O N S
So far, we introduced cloud computing (Section 1.1) and our scenario
which is an Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) cloud provider that of-
fers virtual machines (VMs) to customers on demand and according
to the principle of “pay-per-use” (Section 1.4). We briefly outlined
certain security issues of cloud computing (Section 1.2) and new op-
portunities introduced be the cloud and its underlying technologies
which can be used for security purposes (Section 1.3).
Cloud providers offering the IaaS business model are rapidly grow-
ing and security architectures which are especially tailored towards
this scenario are required. In particular, there is a high demand for
flexible Security-as-a-Service architectures which are basically char-
acterized by their transparent and generic mode of operation (Sec-
tion 1.5). Besides the wish to secure and to protect the systems of the
customers on a better way, these services are a great opportunity for
business as well.
In order to design and implement transparent security services, dif-
ferent problems need to be solved. Techniques are required which
timely and precisely locate information in the data transparently read
from the raw memory and the raw storage or captured on emulated
devices during run-time. Strategies are required which interpret and
make use out of this information, especially regarding security. Com-
plementary mechanisms are required which actively intervene in or-
der to prevent attacks or implement protection mechanisms.
In this work, we present several novel security architectures for the
IaaS cloud computing scenario which benefit from techniques like
VM live cloning (Section 2.3), VM introspection (VMI) (Section 2.4)
and VM live storage forensics (Section 2.5). We designed, implemented
and evaluated the security services in a Xen hypervisor setup (Sec-
tion 2.2). However, the proposed strategies and techniques can also be
used in other hypervisor setups. Our security services operate trans-
parently and run in a tamper-resistant and isolated environment sepa-
rated from the systems of cloud customers (Section 2.1). Our services
use novel, unique and well-defined strategies to analyze information
retrieved in a transparent perspective. The services can be offered by
a cloud provider to its customers to protect their systems. In order
to provide a broad security infrastructure for an IaaS cloud, our pro-
posed security services cover three different major areas in the field
of computer security:
• Transparent Attack Detection: In Chapter 4, we propose three
different security services which detect attacks against the VMs
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of the cloud customers in the early stages. This brings the ad-
vantage, that a cloud provider can intervene in order to prevent
damage. Each of the security services solely retrieves and ana-
lyzes specific information transparently with the help of VMI
(Section 2.4). Furthermore, each of the three services uses a
unique strategy for attack detection. The first service detects
unknown spreading malicious software which was has not been
examined or analyzed before. The second service detects phish-
ing attacks targeting the customers based on hitherto unknown
spoofed web pages and the third service detects Man-in-the-
Browser (MitB) attacks.
• Transparent Attack Analysis: In Chapter 5, we propose two dif-
ferent security services which precisely analyze ongoing attacks
as well as deceive attackers by dynamically extracting and redi-
recting them into isolated honeypot-like environments. These
services use a combination of transparent techniques, basically
VM live cloning (Section 2.3), VMI (Section 2.4) and VM live
storage forensics (Section 2.5). When using the services, cus-
tomers learns from attack techniques and can reveal the inten-
tions and strategies of attackers while their systems remain un-
affected and secured.
• Transparent Attack Mitigation: In Chapter 6, we propose two
different security services operating in a pro-active fashion. The
services use active VMI (Section 2.4), which means they do
not only transparently read and analyze the volatile memory
regions of a customer systems, but they also write to specific
locations during run-time in order to insert new data. The first
service mitigates and prevents attacks by isolating, securely stor-
ing and only temporarily injecting sensitive data into customer
VMs – once it is required and only as long as it is required.
The second service periodically and autonomously deploys op-
timized and custom-made security settings for network applica-
tions running on customer VMs.
Figure 9 illustrates the three different security areas covered by our
seven different security services in the IaaS cloud computing scenario.
Besides other services, the cloud provider can flexibly offer our secu-
rity services to its customers based on a pay-per-use business model.
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Figure 9: Illustration of the three different security areas covered by our
seven different security services for an IaaS cloud scenario.
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4
T R A N S PA R E N T AT TA C K D E T E C T I O N
In this chapter, we introduce three different security services which
detect attacks against systems of cloud customers. The first security
service detects malicious software (malware) by transparently per-
forming integrity measurements on the customers’ software setup
and by detecting spreading behavior of unknown processes among
different systems (Section 4.1). The second security service detects
and mitigates phishing attacks which are executed with the help of
hitherto unknown spoofed web pages (Section 4.2). The third service
detects attacks which use a Man-in-the-Middle strategy, in particular
it can detect Man-in-the-Browser attacks (Section 4.3).
4.1 detection of unknown malicious software
In general, malware is an umbrella term which covers a broad num-
ber of different malicious software components, for example com-
puter worms, viruses, trojan horses, backdoors or rootkits. All these
kinds of malware use different malicious strategies as well as they
have different objectives. Malware is used to gain access to or manipu-
late a target operating system, to record, collect and forward sensitive
data (for example passwords or banking information) or to abuse the
infiltrated system for other attacks like Distributed Denial-of-Service
attacks (DDoS). Often, malware is created for espionage, for financial
gain, for extortion or for sabotage.
For example, in November 2008, the “Conficker” computer worm
infected up to 15 million Windows systems by remotely exploiting
a software vulnerability in the Network Basic Input Output System
(NetBIOS). The worm injected a randomly named Dynamic Link Li-
brary (DLL) into an authentic Windows process (svchost.exe) [48].
Version A of Conficker focused on the infection of operating sys-
tems connected within the same internal network. This resulted in
fast propagation and high network traffic within local networks of or-
ganizations. Version B additionally used brute force attacks to guess
passwords of other network services and version C of Conficker even
used a P2P protocol in order to manage and optimize its own propa-
gation [32]. In the year 2010, a new computer worm named “Stuxnet”
ushered in a new era of autonomously spreading malware. This com-
puter worm aimed to manipulate industrial control systems which
are used for Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA).
Stuxnet was able to attack a range of different Windows operating sys-
tems (version 2000 up to 7) by using different known and unknown
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exploiting techniques [24]. The occurrence of Stuxnet and its revised
successors Duqu (2011) and Flame (2012) showed that the danger
caused by spreading malware is far away from being over.
Constantly, new autonomous computer worms are created and pro-
pagate, although sophisticated detection and mitigation techniques
are used. Even detection software like anti-virus software installed
on the affected operating systems can be manipulated by the mal-
ware or can be misconfigurated by unaware users. Furthermore, de-
tection software is often based on a large up-to-date database of
signatures of captured and previously analyzed malware. However,
these databases grew increasingly faster and maintenance of an up-
to-date database becomes more and more challenging. Mitigation of
unknown autonomously spreading malware is still an open problem
which we address in this first security service for the IaaS cloud.
In traditional computer networks, each operating system is installed
on a single hardware component. On the contrary, the cloud com-
puting network is virtualized and multiple operating systems run in
parallel on a single physical hardware platform, managed by a hyper-
visor (Section 2.2). In the cloud, malware can still infect the customers’
operating systems and spread for example by exploiting software vul-
nerabilities in the network applications. Computer worms which au-
tonomously infect systems within a cloud computing network can
even propagate faster and on a larger scale because the cloud envi-
ronment is often quite homogenous with a lot of similar software
installations. However, by benefiting from the underlying virtualized
infrastructure of the IaaS cloud, information about running systems
can be retrieved faster, more easily and more extensive.
In the most incidences, malicious software (malware) is injected
into operating systems either by exploiting software vulnerabilities,
misconfigurations or social engineering strategies such as emails hav-
ing spoofed senders. Since the customers of the IaaS cloud gain full
administrative privileges over the operating systems running in VMs,
they are also responsible for security updates and correct software
configuration. However, cloud customers do not always have the ex-
pertise in the field of security nor is every customer frequently deploy-
ing urgent security updates. This can finally lead to compromised
systems and infections with malware within the IaaS cloud network.
In this section, we introduce a security service which detects hith-
erto unknown propagating malware and this way protects the sys-
tems of the cloud customers. Our proposed security service operates
transparently and can be easily and beneficially implemented in ex-
isting cloud architectures.
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4.1.1 Transparent Integrity Measurements
A popular approach to detect unknown malware are integrity mea-
surements performed on a software setup. In order to verify the in-
tegrity of a running application of a cloud customer, we verify the exe-
cutable code of the corresponding process stored in the VM’s volatile
memory during run-time. In most operating systems, each process
runs in its own virtual address space which is mapped to physi-
cal memory addresses by a page table maintained by the operating
system. In a hypervisor setup, a second layer of memory addresses
comes into play which is managed by the underlying hypervisor soft-
ware and used to create a virtual memory container for each VM. In
order to measure integrity, we first need to locate the memory pages
storing the executable code of the target process. In Linux, the exe-
cutable code of a process is stored in the Executable and Linkable
Format (ELF) in the volatile memory in the text region. Figure 10 il-
lustrates the different memory regions which need to be investigated
in a hypervisor setup.
First, the physical memory region assigned to a customer’s VM
needs to be retrieved. Subsequently, specific statically stored informa-
tion from the operating system’s kernel is read which finally allows
to locate the different memory pages assigned to a target running
process in the userspace. Finally, the memory pages which store the
executable code can be located. Other memory pages assigned to the
process are for example the stack, the heap or mappings. In this sec-
tion, we are only interested in the executable code. For localization,
previous information about the static internals of the used kernel de-
fined in a profile is required (Section 2.4). The currently allocated
and used memory pages of the target process are transparently read
from the co-located administrative VM (dom0) and the integrity of
the executable code can be verified.
Figure 10: Different memory regions investigated in order to read the exe-
cutable code (ELF) of a target process from a transparent hyper-
visor perspective.
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After localization, we compute a cryptographic hash function over
the data and compare the result with a hash of the application stored
in a white-list in a database in the administrative VM (dom0). This
way, the integrity of the process can be transparently verified during
run-time and any modifications on the executable code in the mem-
ory, for example executed by malware as well as any unknown and
not white-listed running process are revealed.
The integrity measurement of a cloud customer’s process can be
used as the last element in a chain of subsequent verifications of a hy-
pervisor setup. In the concept of Trusted Computing (TC) introduced
by the Trusted Computing Group1, a chain of trust is used to verify
the integrity of an entire software platform. The chain uses a trust
anchor as “root of trust”. This anchor is a hardware device called
Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The chain of trust is subsequently
created by performing integrity measurements over the concatenation
of a previous hash and a new hash over a piece of code.
However, in this work, we do not use a chain of trust or a TPM.
Instead, we assume a trustworthy hypervisor setup and a trustworthy
co-located administrative VM (dom0) which can not be accessed from
the network used by the cloud customers. In this proposed security
service, we use the transparently retrieved integrity measurements of
running processes to detect unknown spreading malware among the
operating systems of different customers.
4.1.2 Identifying the Propagation of Malware
The security service transparently monitors properties of running pro-
cesses in different customers’ operating systems with the help of VMI
(Section 2.4). The service can not be manipulated by malware which
successfully compromised an operating system because the service
operates isolated on the administrative VM (Figure 11).
In particular, software virtualization offers an elegant way to iden-
tify spreading malware without the need to have previously gener-
ated signatures. Our service randomly monitors VMs of different
customers and interprets the status of the entire cloud network by
using a centralized superior perspective. Unknown spreading mal-
ware is detected only by identifying the spreading behavior of an
effect caused by the malware on a constantly increasing number of
different operating systems. Once detected, a signature is generated
and used in traditional network traffic filtering software.
We first define an anomaly which is tracked by our security service
within the cloud network: An anomaly is an unknown running process
P of which the integrity could not be verified by comparing the hash over
P’s executable code stored in the volatile memory with white-listed hashes of
known benign processes stored in a database (Subsection 4.1.1).
1 http://www.trustedcomputinggroup.org/
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Figure 11: Location of the security service isolated and transparently oper-
ating on the administrative VM (dom0).
The service transparently retrieves the required information from
different and randomly chosen VMs. In particular, a single detected
anomaly is not conclusive; however, if a continuous propagation of
the same anomaly can be discovered on an increasing number of dif-
ferent VMs within the IaaS cloud network, an autonomous propaga-
tion of unknown malware can be assumed. Our service successively
scans different VMs in time intervals ∆t. Once a steady increase in
the occurrence of the same anomaly exceeds a defined threshold T ,
a signature is generated and deployed on network traffic filtering
software. Figure 12 illustrates the architecture of the proposed secu-
rity service which uses a centralized component called propagation
detector. The detector retrieves information from the administrative
VM’s running on different physical servers which host multiple cus-
tomer VMs in parallel. The detector transparently retrieves informa-
tion about currently running processes on the system of a target VM
and uses results for comparison with information in its database.
In detail, the procedure of the security service works as follows:
1. It retrieves a list of running processes from a randomly chosen
customer VM by transparently investigating the corresponding
volatile memory regions with VMI in combination with mem-
ory forensic techniques (Section 2.4).
2. For comparison with a white-list, it uses the name of the process
or a hash over the executable code of the process (Section 4.1.1).
3. Once the service reveals an unknown running process it adds it
to a list of unknown processes.
4. For each unknown process, the service scans the number of oc-
currences and identifies if the same unknown process continu-
ously appears on an increasing number of customer VMs within
the IaaS cloud network.
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Figure 12: Architecture of the proposed security service which detects the
propagation of unknown spreading malware by transparently re-
vealing its spreading characteristics.
5. If the occurrence exceeds the threshold T , a spreading malware
is found and mitigation is initialized (e.g. isolating infected VMs
or deploying a signature on traffic filtering software).
6. In contrast, if the occurrence decreases without exceeding the
threshold T , the process is removed from the list of unknown
processes and its information is added to a white-list.
This way, unknown spreading malware can be transparently iden-
tified only by its spreading behavior itself without the need to have
any previous information about the malware and without influenc-
ing or interrupting the systems of the customers. Furthermore, the
proposed security service can continuously add unknown harmless
processes to a white-list stored in a central database.
We implemented the proposed security service in order to evalu-
ate the timings of the used techniques. We used a Xen hypervisor
setup (Section 2.2) with an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 3 Ghz and
4 GB of memory. The service was requested remotely, operated on
the administrative VM (dom0) and monitored a co-dissent customer
VM (domU). Both VMs run Ubuntu Linux 10.04. Remotely retriev-
ing information about running processes of the target customer VM
and verifying the corresponding integrity measurements can be per-
formed in 2.2± 1.8 seconds. Multiple requests can be performed in
parallel retrieving information from different VMs.
Furthermore, we developed a simulation in Java in order to evalu-
ate the proposed detection strategy in a large-scaled cloud comput-
ing scenario. We simulated the rapid propagation of malware among
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different systems. In general, the detection time is influenced by the
scanning interval ∆t, the spreading time of the malware, a defined
threshold T and the number of vulnerable VMs in the cloud network.
The simulation showed that when using a scanning interval ∆t of 500
ms, a threshold T of 6 and 1024 running VMs, the simulated malware
having a spreading time of 2 seconds can be identified before it can
affect more than 50% of the vulnerable customer systems. Once the
malware could be revealed, mitigation strategies can be automatically
initiated and immediately prevent further propagation. The number
of infected systems greatly decreases once the malware’s spreading
time is higher (Table 1).
spreading time of malware infected customer systems until detection
2 seconds 60%
4 seconds 42%
8 seconds 26%
Table 1: Infected systems until detection of the unknown spreading malware
depending on the malware’s spreading time.
The evaluation of a prototype showed the feasibility of the pro-
posed security service. Even if the service can not prevent infection,
it can mitigate the propagation and protect a notable number of cus-
tomer systems. The service can be used to transparently detect un-
known malware which autonomously propagates or malware which
is injected with autonomously operating hacking tools (“auto-rooters”)
in the IaaS cloud network.
In this security service, we showed how we can benefit from a com-
bination of properties of the IaaS cloud’s underlying virtualization
technologies and a broad perspective enabled by a cloud computing
network in general.
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4.2 data-centric detection of phishing attacks
In the second proposed security service, we focus on the detection
of phishing attacks which are executed with the help of hitherto un-
known spoofed web pages. In a recent survey about phishing attacks
from 2013, Khonji et al. [42] defined phishing as “a type of computer
attack that communicates socially engineered messages to humans
via electronic communication channels in order to persuade them to
perform certain actions for the attacker’s benefit.” Phishing attacks
exploit the good nature of humans. Targets are found via email, web
pages, SMS, VoIP or even in computer games. Phishing can lead to
huge financial loss as well as loss of privacy. According to a report
of the Anti-Phishing Work Group2, from October to December 2012
more than 140.000 new unique spoofed phishing web pages have
been found. About 66% targeted the financial sector and payment
services. The motives of phishing attacks are mostly financial gain,
but also industrial espionage, distribution of malware or harvesting
passwords [90]. Even though the idea of phishing is old, phishing
attacks are still a major problem since there is no automatic and ef-
fective way of elimination, mainly because it is a social-engineering
attack and the human factor plays a key role. Studies [74] showed that
28% of users fell for phishing attacks, even if they have been previ-
ously trained to recognize them. Unfortunately 23% of ordinary users
do not even look at the browser’s address bar to verify the source of
a web page [20].
Phishing attacks are social engineering attacks which aim at iden-
tity theft. In many cases, the unaware user reveals critical and sen-
sitive information like login credentials or for example a credit card
number. The most common phishing attack is redirecting a user to
a prepared phishing web page which looks as similar as possible
to an authentic web page of an arbitrary institution (mostly of a fi-
nancial institution). With the help of the spoofed web page, the at-
tacker requests sensitive information. In order to give a plausible sce-
nario, faked reasons for these requests are errors in the institution’s
database, “verification” of the user’s account or solving any problems
regarding current financial transfers. Unaware users often do not rec-
ognize the ongoing attack, since they are sure to communicate with
the real institution’s web page. The URLs to these spoofed web pages
are transmitted to the users in different ways, mostly via email in-
cluding social-engineered text content to convince the user. Recently,
the URLs are also transmitted via instant messaging, social networks,
SMS or in Massively Multiplayer Online Games [35]. Unfortunately,
an increasing appearance of specifically tailored phishing attacks can
be found on the Internet. These attacks are called “spear phishing”
attacks [35] because they have a specific single target and use contex-
2 http://www.antiphishing.org
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tual information like the user’s real name. “Spear phishing”-attacks
mostly aim at high-level targets (for example CEOs) and they are
much harder to detect. Since phishing is still one of the fastest grow-
ing crimes, novel and automated anti-phishing approaches are re-
quired.
In order to mitigate phishing attacks, we propose a novel anti-
phishing security service which uses the underlying virtualization
technologies of cloud computing and which is based on fine-grained
VMI (Section 2.4). The service monitors the VMs of customers and ex-
amines the volatile memory pages that are currently assigned to the
customer’s browser application. Once a new web page is loaded, the
service extracts certain specific information from the raw data of these
memory pages and generates a unique fingerprint based on color val-
ues used in the processed web page’s code as well as in buffered
images and icons. Since phishing is a social engineering attack and
the human factor plays a major role, the service performs human per-
ceptual similarity analysis on the generated fingerprints in order to
detect phishing attacks which are based on spoofed web pages that
look similar to known authentic web pages. The proposed service
generically supports every browser software in every version running
in an arbitrary operating system. To the best of our knowledge, this is
the first phishing detection and prevention approach based on trans-
parent VMI techniques for a cloud computing scenario.
4.2.1 Existing Anti-Phishing Architectures
Contemporary browsers usually protect the users from phishing at-
tacks with the help of black-lists which can be used in automated
mechanisms. Le et al. [51] proposed the LARX architecture (Large-
scale anti-phishing by Retrospective data-eXploration). LARX filters
URL requests and searches for black-listed URLs retrieved from the
Google Safe Browsing API3. However, databases which provide black-
lists rely on diligent manual submitters and verifiers of suspicious
URLs. Black-listing is very effective, but strongly depends on up-to-
date information. New and unknown phishing web pages can remain
undetected for a long period of time. Unfortunately, new phishing
web pages are rapidly deployed and proxies or DNS poisoning at-
tacks can be used to circumvent the black-lists. Automated mitigation
techniques are required. Bin et al. [80] proposed a DNS based anti-
phishing approach which works by sniffing the user’s HTTP packets.
Their architecture additionally request several trusted DNS servers
for the IP address of the receiver of sensitive information and can ver-
ify if the receiver is authentic. Pal et al. [61] presented PhishBouncer, a
middleware which inspects the user’s HTTP traffic in order to rapidly
detect and block interactions with phishing web pages. There are
3 http://code.google.com/apis/safebrowsing/
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also mitigation strategies which are more offensive and suggest ac-
tively flooding identified phishing web pages with huge amounts of
spoofed credentials ([91], [43]).
A lot of proposed anti-phishing architectures are extensions to the
browser (plugins). These extensions monitor the web page which the
browser displays and analyze certain meaningful visual characteris-
tics. Chou et al. [17] proposed Spoofguard, a browser plugin which
examines different tests on displayed web pages and summarizes the
results in a score. Fotiou et al. [26] implemented a browser exten-
sion where the spoofed web pages are detected based on graphical
similarity to authentic web pages. Rajalingam et al. [54] proposed a
phishing detection architecture which uses key point features of spe-
cific images from full snapshots of the suspicious and the authentic
web pages. They use block-wise similarity analysis of the snapshots.
White et al. [88] proposed an anti-phishing architecture which uses
comparison of images based on Hamming distances in combination
with certain other characteristics like the number of included links. Fu
et al. [28] used the Earth Mover’s Distance to calculate the distances
of the web page’s images for visual assessment. Medvet et al. [56]
identified features which play a key role in building a phishing web
page that looks similar to an authentic one: Text pieces, the style,
and embedded images. Rosiello et al. [71] improved the detection
techniques by analyzing the entire displayed web page’s DOM-tree
representation.
All these anti-phishing architectures are browser extensions or soft-
ware components running on the same operating system which actu-
ally means the architectures can be manipulated or disabled by mal-
ware. Even social-engineering attacks can convince unaware users
and bring them to ignore or disable the protection mechanisms. If
the protection mechanisms process snapshots of the browser’s graph-
ical output, they suffer from the fact that other frames can obfus-
cate the required features and they can be strongly influenced by fre-
quently changing content like advertising banners. Moreover, browser
extensions often support only a specific version of a browser and are
quickly out of date. Our proposed anti-phishing security service is no
extension to a browser, it runs isolated in the an administrative VM
(dom0) and transparently extracts data from a browser’s allocated
memory operating on a customer VM on the same physical hardware.
Furthermore, our proposed service uses human perceptual similarity
analysis which takes into account that the human eye is more sensi-
tive to certain colors than to others.
4.2.2 Architecture of the Anti-Phishing Service
The proposed security services focuses on the detection of phishing
attacks which are based on redirection to spoofed web pages that imi-
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tate authentic web pages. The security service transparently retrieves
information about a cloud customer’s browser by directly reading its
currently allocated memory pages via VMI (Section 2.4). In compar-
ison to the proposed security service of Section 4.1.1, in which we
transparently located and verified the executable code (ELF) of a run-
ning process with the help of VMI, we now transparently analyze
dynamically allocated memory pages assigned to the stack, the heap
and anonymously mapped regions of a process. Figure 13 illustrates
the location and perspective of the anti-phishing service operating on
the administrative VM (dom0) and investigating memory pages of a
customer VM. Figure 14 illustrates the different memory layers inves-
tigated by the proposed service. First, it retrieves the physical mem-
ory region allocated by the target customer VM, then, depending on
the used operating system, it investigates specific static kernel infor-
mation in order to retrieve the addresses of the currently allocated
memory pages of the browser process. Finally, the located memory
pages of the process in the user space are read and the stored infor-
mation is analyzed.
Figure 13: Perspective of the proposed anti-phishing security service.
Figure 14: Different memory regions investigated in order to analyze dy-
namically stored data of a target process (browser application)
from the transparent hypervisor perspective.
The operation of the anti-phishing service is illustrated in a flow
graph having different sequential steps running in a loop (Figure 15).
In general, there are two major components: The extractor which lo-
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cates, retrieves and pre-processes the required information from the
raw data read from the volatile memory and the detector which per-
forms human perceptual similarity analysis and intervenes once an
ongoing phishing attack was detected.
Figure 15: Flow-graph of the proposed anti-phishing security service.
4.2.2.1 Design of the Extractor
The extractor waits for the download of new web content. Once it
could identify a new download, it generates a new fingerprint from a
web page which the customer’s browser currently processes. The ex-
tractor is responsible for localizing, retrieving, filtering and balancing
color values from different sources present in the accessed and pro-
cessed web page into a fixed-length fingerprint. Since contemporary
browsers use a lot of memory to store and process various informa-
tion, the performance of the extractor is an important issue. The ex-
tractor is triggered once new incoming HTTP traffic to the customer’s
VM from a new remote source could be detected. The network traf-
fic of the VM can be transparently monitored and analyzed since it
passes the hypervisor layer which can be accessed by the extractor
that operates in the administrative VM (dom0). Once an extraction
procedure is triggered, four subsequent steps are executed:
1. Localization: Memory pages which the browser has currently
allocated and which are assigned to the stack or the heap are
identified. Buffered images and the code of web pages are local-
ized within these identified memory pages.
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2. Extraction: Color values are extracted from the localized content
while content belonging to the browser application is ignored.
This is done based on comparison of the content to an initial
database containing typical colors of the browser software.
3. Filtering: Extracted color values which are not characteristic
enough and which belong to known false-positives are removed.
4. Scaling: Since the extractor uses two different sources to re-
trieve color values (buffered images and the web page’s code),
the collected values are balanced and scaled into a fingerprint
having a fixed length.
4.2.2.2 Design of the Detector
The detector processes the newly generated fingerprint from the ex-
tractor to reveal an ongoing phishing attack. The detector performs
human perceptual similarity analysis on the new fingerprint and
stored fingerprints of known authentic web pages from its database.
The fingerprints of this database are previously generated from a
number of popular authentic web pages (including their IP addresses)
which are known to be a frequent target of phishing attacks (for ex-
ample popular financial institutions). Similarity analysis is performed
by calculating the human perceptual color distance of the new finger-
print to each one of the known fingerprints from the database. Once
a result shows high similarity between two fingerprints, the detector
inspects the current network communication of the customer’s VM in
order to match the identified institution to its valid known remote IP
address. If a download of a web page from the corresponding remote
source could be verified, there is no need to intervene and the cur-
rently processed and displayed web page was downloaded from the
authentic institution. On the contrary, if there was no communication
with the corresponding remote source on the network, but the web
page which is processed and displayed on the browser has a high
similarity to a web page of a known institution, an ongoing phishing
attack based on a spoofed web page is assumed. In this case, the cloud
customer is redirected to a prepared web page on which information
about the incident is displayed.
The proposed security service is able to detect unknown phishing
pages which have never been seen and investigated before. Our strat-
egy brings the creators of phishing pages into a dilemma: The more
similar a prepared phishing page is to the original web page, the eas-
ier it can be detected by our service. However, if phishing pages are
created which look that less similar to the original pages so that our
security service will not detect them, the users may not fall for the
phishing attack anyway.
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4.2.3 Implementation and Strategy
We implemented the security service for the Xen hypervisor (Sec-
tion 2.2) and used fine-grained VMI (Section 2.4) for live memory
forensics. In comparison to the previously proposed security service
used for malware detection (Section 4.1.1), we now transparently in-
vestigate dynamic memory regions.
4.2.3.1 Implementation of the Extractor
The extractor detects an ongoing download of a new web page from a
new remote IP address by monitoring the incoming HTTP to the tar-
get VM. In order to extract only relevant information and no browser
internal data, the extractor maintains a list of hashes from a browser’s
internally used images (for example icons) as well as internally used
HTML code segments (for example of help pages). By comparing
new computed hashes over the extracted content of the current scan
and hashes stored in a database, the extractor can reveal new and
relevant content which is used for further analysis. The extractor cre-
ates a vector of independently extracted RGB values as a fingerprint
which is characteristic for a currently processed and displayed web
page. For this purpose, the extractor identifies the locations of im-
ages and icons in the memory based on specific unique start and
end byte sequences of different formats (e.g. PNG and JPEG). From
each localized image, the extractor rapidly extracts s randomly se-
lected RGB values. For each image, the number s of extracted ran-
dom colors is calculated with an optional initial parameter Ls by
s = (widthimg + heightimg) · Ls where width and height are the
dimensions of the image. This way, larger images influence the result-
ing fingerprint more than smaller images. Furthermore, randomly se-
lecting RGB values leads to the establishment of characteristic RGB
values. The extracted RGB values of the images are stored in a tem-
porary list.
Images can use a big amount of white and black color values which
often belong to letters in text content or just to the background. In
general, web pages use a lot of very bright subtypes of white colors
and very dark subtypes of black colors which the human eye cannot
really distinguish. These RGB values are not characteristic for a web
page. The extractor calculates the brightness b of each RGB value by
b =
√
r2+g2+b2
3 and drops RGB values which have a brightness below
an optional limiting parameter Lbottom or which have a brightness
exceeding an optional limiting parameter Ltop. This way, very bright
and very dark RGB color values are dropped.
In order to extract a characteristic color-based fingerprint of the
currently processed web page, the extractor focuses on characteris-
tic colors, for example of logos and icons which often have a unique
style. In particular, logos or icons use less different colors than for
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example photographs. This means these images are usually charac-
terized by the fact that the same RGB values appear more often in
the amount of selected random pixels. Since a web page can contain
photographs which are less characteristic for the web page, the ex-
tractor filters the list of RGB values depending on the occurrence of
each extracted RGB value. RGB values which occur less frequently
than a previously defined optional limit Locc are dropped. Finally,
the extractor has created a filtered list of RGB values of the browser’s
processed images.
After processing the color values from buffered images and icons,
the extractor localizes HTML code snippets within the analyzed mem-
ory pages and extracts color values in hexadecimal form with the help
of regular expressions. These HTML color values are also temporar-
ily stored in a list which is subsequently filtered. Since the regular
expressions can match false-positives which have the same spelling
than hexadecimal colors but are actually no real color values (for ex-
ample #dec is often used as a “decode” tag but also matches a green
color shade in hexadecimal), these known false-positives are addition-
ally filtered. Subsequently, the HTML hexadecimal color values are
converted into RGB color values and they are also filtered based on
their brightness and their occurrence like the RGB values of images.
Since there are usually much more RGB values of images than of
the HTML code, but the HTML RGB color values are very charac-
teristic for a web page (for example they are used as font colors or
as the background color of an entire web page), the lists of RGB
values from the two different sources are merged depending on a
weighted optional balancing factor fb. Following this strategy, the
extractor adds HTML color values n-times to the list of both types
where n = colorsimages·fbcolorshtml . Finally, the extractor creates a weighted
fixed-size color fingerprint vector of the length fs. In summary, the
extractor’s procedures and a resulting fingerprint depends on the pa-
rameters listed in Table 2.
parameter description
Ls number of selected random RGB values from images
Lbottom brightness limit for RGB values (bottom)
Ltop brightness limit for RGB values (top)
Locc minimum required occurrence for RGB values
fb balancing factor for the merging procedure
fs fixed size of the resulting fingerprint
Table 2: Parameters influencing the creation of a color-based fingerprint.
Since the browser can process different web pages or multiple tabs
of the browser can be used, the extractor maintains a list of hashes
over sets of already analyzed memory pages. Once a download of
a new web page could be detected, the extractor can calculate new
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hashes for comparison and only analyze memory pages which have
been modified (and most likely contain the new processed data).
4.2.3.2 Implementation of the Detector
The detector compares a new generated fingerprint with known fin-
gerprints from a database. Comparison of two fingerprints is per-
formed with the help of human perceptual similarity analysis of col-
ors which closely resembles the way a human recognizes colors and
their differences. Since phishing attacks are social engineering attacks,
analyzing the similarity in a human perceptual view brings several
advantages. Small changes in the used colors on a web page do not
necessarily lead to changes in the human perception of that page and
the human eye is more sensitive to certain colors than to others. In
particular, the “look-and-feel” of the characteristic design of the web
page as a whole is compared.
The similarity analysis is performed as follows: First, the detector
converts the RGB color values of the fingerprints into the CIE4 Lab
color space [83]. The Lab color space (L*a*b) uses luminance (L) and
two color channels (a, b). For the conversion, the detector uses an ob-
server in 2 ◦ and the CIE Standard Illuminant D65. In the L*a*b* color
space, changes in a color approximately correspond to the human
perception and therefore it is particularly suitable for our purposes.
Given two colors (L1,a1,b1) and (L2,a2,b2) and the application de-
pending weighting factors SC = 1+ 0.045 ∗ (a21 + b21) and SH = 1+
0.015 ∗ (a21 + b21) (recommended factors by CIE for graphic arts) and
Equation 1 and Equation 2, the detector can compute the human per-
ceptual color distance ∆e of the two colors by applying the CIE (94)
formula for color distance (Equation 3).
∆C =
√
a21 + b
2
1 −
√
a22 + b2
2 (1)
∆H =
√
(a1 − a2)2 + (b1 − b2)2 − (∆C)2 (2)
∆e =
√
(L1 − L2)
2 ·
(
∆C
SC
)2
·
(
∆H
SH
)2
(3)
The detector performs similarity analysis of two fingerprints F1 and
F2 by sorting the color values and computing the perceptual distances
of each color value from F1 to the color value on the same position in
F2. This yields a vector of individual distances. Finally, the detector
computes the length of the difference vector with the Euclidean norm.
4 International Commission on Illumination (CIE)
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If a new fingerprint from the browser’s memory and a fingerprint
from the database are very similar, but there was no communication
with the known remote IP address of the corresponding institution,
an ongoing phishing attack is assumed.
4.2.4 Evaluation
For an evaluation, we used an Intel Core 2 Duo CPU with 3 Ghz,
4 GB of memory, a Xen hypervisor (4.1) setup and a customer VM
with Ubuntu Linux 12.04 running Mozilla Firefox. We investigated
how characteristic the generated fingerprints are and how feasible
the proposed anti-phishing service is under realistic conditions.
4.2.4.1 Timings and Fingerprint Generation
First, we evaluated the timings of the procedures. For this, we mea-
sured the timings of three sub-procedures using the parameters Ls of
4, Locc of 4, Lbottom of 3, Ltop of 252, fb of 0.5 and fs of 64. Based on
100 independent test-runs, the color value extraction and processing
takes 2.6± 0.2 seconds, the fingerprint generation 1.2± 0.1 seconds
and a similarity analysis 0.2± 0.1 seconds in our setup. On average,
the proposed service requires around 4 seconds to scan the mem-
ory pages of the browser of the target customer’s VM, to extract the
required data, to generate a new, filtered, balanced and scaled color-
based fingerprint and finally to analyze the perceptual difference of
two different fingerprints. This is usually fast enough to detect an
ongoing phishing attack before an ordinary user can enter valid cre-
dentials on a real phishing web page. However, we nevertheless use
Linux HTTP outgoing traffic shaping on the hypervisor layer to delay
the outgoing traffic of the VM until the analysis is finished.
The generated fingerprints can often be distinguished just by using
the human eye. Figure 16 illustrates two example fingerprints from
the Chase bank (left) and the ICICI bank (right) in visualized color
maps (fs of 64).
Figure 16: Fingerprints of the Chase and the ICICI financial institutions.
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Figure 17: Differences as result of human perceptual similarity analyses of
generated fingerprints among the Alexa top 10 web pages in the
category financial services. Each triangle represents the average
of 100 analyses with new generated fingerprints. Analyses of fin-
gerprints of the same web page have always the lowest difference.
Characteristic colors which belong to the specific brands can be
found and they can be identified on both web pages. The web page of
the Chase bank prefers different shades in very light blue and green
while the web page of the ICICI bank uses shades in light gray, red
and orange. There are several characteristic colors hidden on the web
pages which can be seen during interaction with the web page, for
example if menu buttons are clicked.
For automated evaluations, we used the Alexa top 100 web pages
in the category financial services5. These institutions are continuously
top targets of phishing attacks. In general, the generated color-based
fingerprints slightly vary, although they are generated from the data
of the same web page. This is because the extractor randomly selects
RGB values of localized images. In particular, usable fingerprints gen-
erated from the processed memory pages need to have two major re-
quirements: A stable low difference between two fingerprints of the
same web page and a high difference between fingerprints of dif-
ferent web pages. Figure 17 shows results of the human perceptual
similarity analysis among the created fingerprints of the top 10 in-
stitutions, in each case the average of 100 independently generated
fingerprints. The lower the resulting perceptual difference, the more
equal are the color-based fingerprints in a human perceptual way.
In Figure 17, the difference between the fingerprints is always the
smallest if both fingerprints are generated from the same web page.
Two fingerprints can be clearly distinguished if they are generated
from web pages of two different institutions. In these cases, the hu-
man perceptual difference is much higher. In our test-runs, a common
5 http://www.alexa.com/topsites/category/Top/Business/Financial_Services
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threshold which could be used to detect real phishing pages target-
ing these 10 web pages could be 228. We also evaluated fingerprints
of all Alexa top 100 web pages in the category financial services and
compared them to each other. On average, the perceptual difference
among fingerprints of a target web page and fingerprints of all the
other web pages is 372.1± 21.7.
A false-positive occurs if two fingerprints of two different web
pages cannot be distinguished because the perceptual difference be-
tween them is equal or even less than the perceptual difference be-
tween two fingerprints from the same web page. This case occurred
only once in our test-runs which leads to a false-positive rate of 1%.
Table 3 gives an overview of the average number of processed color
values during the fingerprint extraction procedures of the Alexa top
100 web pages.
description average num-
ber
RGB values extracted from images 6766± 8276
RGB values extracted from images after filtering 2504± 2017
RGB values extracted from HTML code 392± 218
RGB values extracted from HTML code after filtering 383± 213
Table 3: Number of processed RGB values on average before scaling into a
weighted fixed-size fingerprint (they include repetitive values).
In particular, the color-based fingerprints generated from the cus-
tomer’s volatile memory and the results of the human perceptual
similarity analysis performed on these fingerprints are characteristic
enough to be used in our transparent anti-phishing service. Finger-
prints of selected institutions and their average difference among each
other can be stored in a database. If a computed perceptual difference
of a currently processed web page falls below a defined limit, our ser-
vice can investigate the traffic and trigger an alert. With the help of
the fingerprints, the proposed service can reliably reveal if a spoofed
and processed web page looks similar to an authentic web page. The
more a spoofed web page is actually perceived like an authentic web
page in a human perceptual way, the better it can be detected.
We investigated the dependence of the similarity analysis of the
Alexa top 10 on the parameters Lbottom, Ltop, Locc and Ls. The
higher the average perceptual difference among the fingerprints, the
better the used parameters are for our purposes. Fig 18 shows a clear
trend when using different values for Lbottom and Ltop. The more
colors are removed because of their brightness or their darkness the
less the fingerprints differ. Accordingly, color values should only be
removed if they are very bright or very dark. The more colors are re-
moved depending on how often they occur (Locc), the more different
are the fingerprints (Fig 19). Consequently, the more often a color oc-
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curs, the more characteristic it is. Furthermore, the number of pixels
which are randomly chosen from located images should not be too
small to get an overview on the characteristics (Ls), but also not too
high since it slows down the procedures (Fig 20). As robust values for
the parameters, we suggest to use a Lbottom of 4 and a Ltop of 251
for brightness and darkness filtering, a Locc of 4 for filtering based
on the occurrence and a Ls of 4 for the number of selected random
pixels from each image.
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Figure 18: Average difference in the human perceptual similarity analysis
depending on the parameters for brightness filtering (Lbottom
and Ltop).
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Figure 19: Average difference in the human perceptual similarity analysis
depending on the parameter for occurrence filtering (Locc).
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Figure 20: Average difference in the human perceptual similarity analysis
depending on the parameter for the number of selected pixels
from buffered images (Ls).
4.2.4.2 Evaluation with Real Phishing Web Pages
Furthermore we investigated whether real spoofed web pages look
similar to the authentic web pages of the target institutions by us-
ing our proposed fingerprint comparison approach. For this evalua-
tion, we used real phishing web pages which we could currently find
on the Internet6. Figure 21 shows the human perceptual differences
among original web pages (green) and among the original and real
phishing web pages (red). The results clearly show that the real phish-
ing web pages are strongly similar to the original web pages based
on our generated color-based fingerprints from the raw data transpar-
ently read from the volatile memory. All of them are located under
the exemplary threshold of 228 (Figure 17).
On average, the difference between a fingerprint of an original and
a corresponding phishing web page is 51.2 ± 16.3, which is much
smaller than the average difference of the fingerprints between a se-
lected web page and all other web pages of the Alexa top 100 which
is 372.1± 21.7. The perceptual similarity analysis of original and real
phishing web pages show that our approach is feasible.
6 http://www.phishtank.com
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Figure 21: Perceptual differences of fingerprints among original web pages
(green) and of fingerprints among the original and real corre-
sponding phishing web pages (red) (average of 100 indepen-
dently generated fingerprints).
The proposed anti-phishing security service detects ongoing phish-
ing with the help of our developed techniques and strategies and
reveals spoofed web pages that look similar to original web pages of
authentic institutions.
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4.3 detection of man-in-the-browser attacks
The third proposed security service focuses on a different type of
phishing attack which is executed with the help of malware that suc-
cessfully infected the customer’s operating system. Compromising
the operating system with malware is often done by exploiting soft-
ware vulnerabilities. However, in the most cases a user is just tricked
to download and install some software additionally containing mal-
ware components. Once the malware is installed, it can execute ar-
bitrary operations on the customer’s software platform. Some mal-
ware focuses on phishing attacks and injects malicious content into
the code of authentic web pages which the browser processes before
it is displayed. This kind of phishing attack is called “Man-in-the-
Browser”-attack (MitB) [84] and has several advantages in compari-
son to phishing attacks based on redirection to spoofed web pages.
MitB-attacks use malicious browser extensions [68] and modify the
web page’s code while it is processed by the browser on-the-fly. An
authentic web page is modified after it is downloaded but before it
is displayed to the user. This way, web forms can be replaced and
detection mechanisms are bypassed. Sensitive information which the
user enters can be captured before it is encrypted and sent to the
real remote institution, even after successful authentication on the
institution’s original web page. For example, the sophisticated third-
generation malware SpyEye [76], which is the successor of the famous
Botnet client Zeus [13], uses MitB techniques. Our third proposed se-
curity service in the field of transparent attack detection reveals and
prevents “Man-in-the-Browser”-attacks.
4.3.1 Architecture of the Anti-MitB Service
A MitB attack in our IaaS cloud computing scenario is illustrated
in Figure 22. Malware has already infected the operating system of
a customer’s VM. While the customer downloads an authentic web
page, the malware modifies the web page’s code on the application
layer while it is processed by the browser but before it is displayed.
However, our proposed MitB-detection service, which operates on
the co-located administrative VM (dom0), captures the authentic web
page’s code during its transfer through the virtualized network de-
vice in the Xen hypervisor setup (Section 2.2) before the MitB attack
is executed.
In order to detect an ongoing MitB attack, the service retrieves in-
formation about the currently processed web page from the volatile
memory as well as it investigates the captured HTTP traffic. The ser-
vice performs similarity analysis of the web page which is down-
loaded and the web page which is finally processed and displayed
by the browser. To identify ongoing MitB attacks, the detector can
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Figure 22: MitB attack: The original web page passes the hypervisor and is
modified at the application layer on the customer’s VM before it
is displayed. The detection service can retrieve information about
the web page before and after the browser has processed it.
again use color values for similarity analysis (Section 4.2), but bet-
ter results are achieved if it analyzes and compares other character-
istic content of a web page’s code in order to reveal modifications.
Our MitB-detection service generates a fingerprint from the captured
HTTP traffic of the downloaded web page and it compares the fin-
gerprint to a second fingerprint transparently retrieved via VMI from
the browser’s allocated memory pages. The detector simply counts
and compares the occurrence of certain characteristic elements. For
example, it counts the number of <form> HTML tags in the code that
is transferred to the customer’s VM and in the data that is processed
and stored by the browser in the volatile memory. This way, the secu-
rity service can detect modifications in the processed HTML code, for
example caused by the insertion of a new web form. If the transfer
of the web page to the customer’s VM was encrypted (SSL/TLS), the
service can request a new download from the same source in order
to generate a fingerprint from the unmodified content.
4.3.2 Evaluation with Real Malware
For the evaluation of the MitB-detection service, we use a VM that
runs Windows Server 2008 R2 SP1 and the Mozilla Firefox. We in-
tentionally infected the system with the PUP.Optional.Walermis and
PUP.Optional.Desk365 malware. This malware uses MitB techniques
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to redirect search queries, to inject additional advertising banners into
displayed web pages and it is also known for phishing attacks.
Figure 23 shows the number of HTML snippets (HTML code identi-
fied by a start and end HTML tag) the browser processes. The infected
browser clearly processed more snippets while visiting bankofamer-
ica.com or chase.com, which means additional unknown content was
inserted into the web page on the application layer.
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Figure 23: Processed HTML snippets during visiting a blank page and the
Alexa top 3 financial services, both with an unmodified browser
and the malware-infected browser.
 0
 200
 400
 600
 800
 1000
 1200
 1400
 1600
blank_page
paypal.com
bankofamerica.com
chase.com
pro
ces
sed
 ur
ls
not infectedinfected
Figure 24: Processed URLs during visiting a blank page and the top 3 finan-
cial services, both with an unmodified browser and a malware-
infected browser.
The difference becomes obvious if the service compares the URLs
a browser processes. In Figure 24, it can be seen that the infected
browser processes two times more URLs even on the blank start page
which is presumably caused by the malware components performing
update requests or communicating with malicious targets. Once the
infected browser processes a web page of the financial targets, it pro-
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cesses up to six times more URLs than it does in the setup that is not
infected. Our security service can store the average number of HTML
snippets and URLs a browser which is not infected processes for a
target known web page and detect ongoing MitB attacks on the cus-
tomer’s VM once previously defined thresholds are clearly exceeded.
4.4 summary
In this chapter, we proposed three different novel security services
for attack detection in an IaaS cloud computing scenario (Section 1.4)
which follow the Security-as-a-Service business model (Section 1.5).
The first service transparently performs integrity measurements on
processes which run in the VMs of cloud customers and uses a per-
spective over the entire cloud network in order to identify the prop-
agation of unknown malware based on its spreading characteristics
(Section 4.1). The second security service uses fine-grained VMI (Sec-
tion 2.4) to extract, filter, balance and scale a color-based fingerprint
from the raw data of a web page which the browser of a cloud cus-
tomer currently processes in its allocated memory pages (Section 4.2).
The service uses human perceptual similarity analysis to compare
generated fingerprints in order to reveal ongoing phishing attacks
which are based on spoofed web pages that look similar to known
authentic web pages in a human perceptual way. The service detects
phishing attacks which using hitherto unknown phishing web pages
that have never been analyzed before. The service operates generi-
cally on the raw memory and this way it supports every browser ap-
plication in every version. Finally, the third security service transpar-
ently detects “Man-in-the-Browser”-attacks by comparing characteris-
tic segments of the content of a web page which a browser processes
and the original downloaded content of the same web page which
passed the hypervisor layer (Section 4.3). These three proposed secu-
rity services run isolated, they cannot be manipulated or tricked by
malware and they can be flexibly provided according to the paradigm
of “pay-per-use”. They can easily be enabled by a cloud customer
since no additional software needs to be installed or configured on a
customer VM.
50
5
T R A N S PA R E N T AT TA C K A N A LY S I S
In this chapter, we introduce two different transparent security ser-
vices which analyze ongoing attacks executed against the VMs of the
cloud customers. The first security service dynamically extracts vir-
tual honeypots from customer VMs in order to analyze the strategies
of attackers and to reveal vulnerabilities. The extracted honeypots run
exactly the same software in the same configuration like the original
VMs being under attack, but they are restricted and they do not al-
low access to any sensitive data (Section 5.1). The second proposed
security service traps detected attackers on the process level in an
isolated environment in order to analyze strategies and intentions
(Section 5.2).
5.1 dynamic honeypot extraction
In this section, we propose a dynamic honeypot service for the IaaS
cloud. Honeypots allow to detect unknown attacks and to study new
attack procedures and patterns. Honeypots are provided either as
low-interactive systems analyzing the incoming network traffic or as
high-interactive systems allowing attackers to access the system in
order to analyze their strategies in more detail. In the IaaS cloud sce-
nario (Section 1.4), we use the hypervisor layer for precise monitoring,
for example the virtualized network device for transparent network
monitoring. Furthermore, we benefit from the fact that new VMs can
be quickly deployed, migrated, cloned or destroyed (Section 2.3).
This flexibility brings several opportunities which we use to im-
prove the design of traditional honeypot architectures. We detect at-
tacks against the customer VMs in their initial phases and promptly
redirect the attacking source to an instantly deployed honeypot with-
out arousing suspicion of the attacker and without terminating the
procedures of executed attacks. In this section, we report the de-
sign, the implementation and evaluation of a fast modifying VM live-
cloning architecture which extracts a reduced VM from an attacked
customer VM. We use this dynamically extracted VM as a honeypot
VM. The proposed method has the advantage of redirecting remote
attacks to a VM which provides exactly the same software compo-
nents in exactly the same up-to-date configuration like the original
attacked VM, but it does not allow access to any sensitive data nor
it does risk the integrity of the original VM. Our proposed honeypot
service can finally investigate if an attack would have been success-
ful on the original VM and immediately inform the customer about
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potential vulnerabilities or misconfigurations. We demonstrate that
timely extraction and precise monitoring can be profitably used to
deploy and benefit from temporary extracted honeypots in the IaaS
cloud scenario. In Section 5.1.2, we describe the dynamic extraction of
low-interactive honeypots, in Section 5.1.3 we describe the extraction
of high-interactive honeypots.
5.1.1 Existing Honeypot Architectures
The concept of honeypots was first described by Clifford Stoll in his
book “The Cuckoo’s Egg” in 1990. Some years later, in 1997, first hon-
eypot projects appeared and in 1998 the first commercial honeypot
(“CyberCop Sting”) was available. This honeypot already used mul-
tiple virtualized systems hosted on a single hardware component. In
1999, the Honeynet1 project was founded. In this project, a group of
security researchers worked on the development of honeypots and
they defined the goals of honeypots as “To learn the tools, tactics
and motives involved in computer and network attacks, and share
the lessons learned”. Since then, the development of sophisticated
honeypots as well as honeynets continued [66]. In recent years, hon-
eypots have become steadily more scalable and flexible. Particularly
well-known and widely-used is the scalable honeyd project of Niels
Provos [65]. Honeyd can create a number of virtual hosts on a net-
work and can flexibly be configured to emulate arbitrary services. In
particular, the timely detection and redirection of malicious network
traffic to dynamically deployed honeypots is constantly a topic of in-
terest and research. Chen et al. [16] used the redirection approach and
a dynamic forensic system for specific investigations in order to min-
imize false-positives. In their work, network traffic which seems to
be anomalous is redirected to shadow servers and a forensic module
collects useful information about executed attacks.
In general, the idea of deploying dynamic honeypots instead of
maintaining static honeypots was first discussed in [15]. Sardana et
al. [72] suggested to use dynamic honeypots to adapt and protect a
network which is under a distributed denial of service attack. Kuwatly
et al. [46] proposed a dynamic honeypot system which adapts itself
to the current network surroundings by passively observing the net-
work traffic. This approach helps to automatically fit the honeypot
seamlessly into the network in which it operates. Hecker et al. [34]
improved this idea by adapting honeypots depending on other hosts
in the local network by using active port scans instead of passive
traffic analysis. This way, the dynamic honeypot can autonomously
and rapidly integrate into a continuously changing network which is
especially interesting for the IaaS cloud scenario being subject to con-
tinuous changes. Artail et al. [5] first deployed virtual low-interactive
1 http://www.honeynet.org
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honeypots which emulate services and which redirect malicious traf-
fic to virtual high-interactive honeypots. All these approaches deal
with the autonomous and dynamic integration of honeypots in con-
stantly changing network surroundings.
The cloud offers several advantages to design honeypots and also
to deliver collected results as a security service to the cloud cus-
tomers [7]. There are some honeypot architectures which use VMI
(Section 2.4) or which use VM live cloning techniques (Section 2.3).
Vrable et al. [85] deployed a large virtual honeyfarm called “Potemkin”
based on virtualization technologies and extensive cloning. There are
also approaches to deploy large-scale on-demand high-interactive vir-
tual honeypots [44]. Lengyel et al. [49] presented “VMI-Honeymoon”
and used fine-grained VMI to precisely monitor a honeypot VM. They
extended their virtual honeypot architecture to a scalable honeynet
system with automated malware capturing [50].
In the work of this section, we especially benefit from the scala-
bility of virtualization technologies and the IaaS cloud scenario (Sec-
tion 2.3). Our proposed honeypot security service is based on VMI
(Section 2.4) and VM live cloning [81] derived from a modified VM
live migration procedure [18].
5.1.2 Low-interactive Honeypots for Attack Evasion
In this section, we describe the architecture of a honeypot service
which dynamically extracts a low-interactive honeypot from a cus-
tomer VM. First, we analyze current network scans and attacks from
real-world data and use the results to design the service.
5.1.2.1 Analysis of Network Attacks
We analyzed captured network traffic in order to gain an insight
into current malicious network traffic. Depending on the targets and
strategies of executed attacks, we design the honeypot service. In this
context, we do not investigate the sources of attacks, but we focus
on the frequency of network attacks and how they are executed in
detail. Depending on the strategies of the most frequent network at-
tacks, we finally design the dynamic low-interactive honeypot service.
First, we analyzed four weeks (January 2012) of network TCP traffic
in a large distributed darknet [1] (also known as network telescope
or black hole network). The darknet captures network traffic which
targets IP addresses being not assigned to a host. Figure 25 shows the
network services which are most frequently contacted by unknown
remote hosts. These scans are usually performed by automated scan-
ning tools. The most scanned service is the Microsoft directory server.
Attackers scan for misconfigurations and try to discover accidentally
exposed data. In this section, we focus on network attacks targeting
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Linux. In this context, the most connection attempts are to the Web
server (80), TELNET (23), X11 (6000) and SSH (22).
Figure 25: TCP services with the most connection attempts in a darknet in
January 2012.
Next, we analyzed four weeks of captured traffic (February 2012)
with the intrusion detection tool Snort2. Results showed that most
packets are generated by ICMP requests. This can be explained with
activity belonging to the reconnaissance phase of autonomous attack-
ing tools or computer worms (Table 4). Attacking tools try to identify
hosts in the network which are available before deeper scans or spe-
cific attacks are initiated. Results also showed a lot of SSH brute force
or dictionary attack attempts, which means the same source repeat-
edly tries to contact the SSH port of the same IP address. Furthermore,
another result is the significant occurrence of SQL worm activity mas-
sively trying to send payloads to remote SQL servers.
threat class occurrence
ICMP ping requests 56%
SSH brute force attempts 28%
SQL worm propagation 11%
portscans and portsweeps 3%
others (tcp port 0 traffic, etc) 2%
Table 4: Detected threats in the captured darknet traffic in February 2012.
For further investigations in more detail, we analyzed four weeks
(March 2012) of network captures and log files of the network services
on a Linux Web server hosting the web page of our research group.
Results showed that more than 69% of incidences are requests which
resulted in “HTTP 404 Not Found”, 17% are “SSHD authentication
failure” and 14% assumed to all other incidences, for example “HTTP
400 Bad Requests” or failed SNMP requests.
2 http://www.snort.org
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In order to have a more detailed view on these incidences, we de-
ployed Linux honeypots providing various network services (sshd,
httpd, sqld, ...) and we captured the network traffic for four weeks.
Results showed that most of the network attacks are either brute force
attacks or scanning attacks on the Web server in order to find default
files corresponding to known vulnerabilities or to find popular mis-
configurations (Table 5). Most used logins in the executed brute force
attacks have been “root”, “bin”, “mysql” and “news” using either
the same string as the password or “12345”. On the Web server, at-
tacks mostly searched for the files that can be seen in Table 6. We
could identify more than 40 different files which are interesting for
attackers since they have known vulnerabilities or they are indicative
for misconfigurations. We considered these results in the triggering
mechanisms of the dynamic honeypot service.
service protocol occurrence
httpd tcp 19.35%
sshd tcp 14.71%
MS terminal services tcp 14.61%
remote administrator (radmin) tcp 6.82%
telnet tcp 4.32%
all others (e.g. standard sql services) tcp 40.19%
WinMX File Sharing udp 12.56%
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) udp 8.84%
Teredo tunneling udp 3.72%
all others (mostly scans for P2P) udp 74.88%
Table 5: Network services with most incoming connections on the deployed
honeypots in June 2012.
/install/index.php
/install/setup.php
/install/configure.php
/mysql/translators.html
/phpMyAdmin/translators.html
/manager/html/index.html
Table 6: Most searched default files on web servers of the honeypots.
If an attacker identifies a vulnerable script on a web server, the
script can already be exploited and cause errors. According to the re-
sults from our captured network traffic analysis, the honeypot service
should definitely focus on preventing attacks against Web servers, es-
pecially prevent successful scans for vulnerable scripts or misconfig-
urations. Furthermore, the service should also prevent the successful
execution of brute force or dictionary attacks, for example against
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the SSH service. In particular, the dynamic honeypot service should
protect from the two different network attacks:
• It should prevent scanning attacks on the Web server which try
to identify default files, vulnerabilities or misconfigurations, but
without risking to reveal sensitive information or the successful
execution of attacks on the original VM.
• It should prevent brute force or dictionary attacks while not
causing suspicion of the attacking source and not revealing any
sensitive information.
5.1.2.2 Architecture of the Low-interactive Honeypot Service
In the following, we describe the design, the implementation and the
evaluation of the proposed low-interactive honeypot security service.
The service identifies attacks before they are successfully executed
and it immediately deploys a new extracted honeypot VM that pro-
tects the original target VM. The service operates efficiently, econom-
ically and saves cloud resources by only using them once they are
required. The major goal is to learn from executed attacks or scans
and identify misconfigurations. The procedure of the low-interactive
honeypot service can be described in seven sequential steps managed
by a honeypot controller (Figure 26).
Figure 26: Flow graph of the proposed low-interactive honeypot service.
In step 1, the honeypot controller identifies an attack which targets
at a customer’s VM located on the same physical hardware. The iden-
tification of an attack is the trigger for the honeypot extraction and
deployment procedure. First, the controller retrieves the IP address of
the customer’s VM which is the target of the ongoing attack and the
IP address of the attacking source. In step 2, the controller delays the
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attack until a new honeypot VM is extracted and was successfully de-
ployed in step 3. The delay is very important since the ongoing attack
should not be interrupted or disturbed. In order to have only a short
delay, the extraction of the new honeypot VM needs to be performed
in the range of seconds. In step 4, the controller redirects the traffic of
the attacking source to the new deployed honeypot VM. In step 5, in-
formation about the ongoing attack is passively collected through the
hypervisor layer. After a predefined period of time or after detecting
the attack being successful, the honeypot VM is terminated and the at-
tacking source is banned from the network in step 6. Finally, in step 7,
a report for the cloud customer owning the original VM is generated.
The report reveals potential vulnerabilities and misconfigurations. In
order to prevent overloading or denial of service attacks, only one
honeypot VM can be deployed on a physical hardware component at
the same time.
Figure 27: Time schedule of the honeypot controller.
Figure 27 illustrates the time line of the proposed security service.
The attacking source sends the first network packets. The controller
can assign these packets to a web directory scan, a brute force attack
or it can identify a payload. The controller detects the attack and
delays these packets and any further packets until a new honeypot
VM is extracted from the original target VM. After the deployment,
the packets are redirected to the new honeypot VM and the attack
procedure can continue. From this point in time, the attack is precisely
monitored and analyzed. The honeypot extraction process needs to
achieve four different objectives:
1. The deployment of the honeypot VM needs to be fast because
the detected attack should only be delayed for a short period of
time. The architecture should not arise suspicion of the attacker
and not interrupt the work-flow of any attack procedures, for
example executed by automated tools.
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2. Instead of having a cloned honeypot VM storing same data, we
want to have a reduced honeypot VM without the real data. To
reach this goal, the service removes previously defined data.
3. Once the controller detects an attack being successful on the
honeypot VM, it immediately terminates the honeypot VM with-
out revealing any information. Accordingly, continuous and pre-
cise monitoring of the deployed honeypot VM is required.
4. There should be no need to install or configure software on the
original VM. All proposed mechanisms should operate trans-
parently according to the SECaaS business model (Section 1.5).
detection and delay of an attack : We used a Xen hypervi-
sor setup (Section 2.2) to implement the proposed service. The con-
troller operates on the administrative VM (dom0). It monitors the
network traffic of all other VMs of the cloud customers hosted on the
same physical hardware. The controller can detect brute force and
dictionary attacks or Web server scans as well as payloads of certain
known exploits. For this, we implemented a kernel module for the
administrative VM using the Netfilter3 framework. We defined and
implemented three simple events which reveal the initiation or the
first packets of attacks and which trigger the extraction of a new hon-
eypot VM:
• Repeats: More than n new connections from the same source IP
address to the same port in a fixed period of time (brute force
or dictionary attacks).
• Incoming data: The content cin was found in an incoming net-
work packet, for example a bunch of No-Operation-Instructions
(NOPs) indicating the shellcode of an exploit.
• Outgoing data: The content cout was found i times in subse-
quent outgoing network packets targeting the same destination,
for example simple HTTP 404 replies. Multiple 404 replies re-
veal a scan for default files.
Based on the results of our captured network traffic investigations
in Section 5.1.2.1, we suggest using the values 5 for the parameter
n, “\x90\x90\x90\x90” for cin and “HTTP1.1 404 Not Found” for
cout with i = 3. More sophisticated rules can be defined as well
as an advanced intrusion detection system can be used to trigger
the extraction procedure. However, we demonstrate the feasibility of
our approach using these three simple event classes. The controller
can detect attacks before they are forwarded on the virtualized net-
work device or during the attacks are performed in the early stages.
3 http://www.netfilter.org/
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It buffers the network packets and identifies packets which break a
defined rule. Once a new honeypot VM is deployed, the malicious
connection is redirected.
extraction of a honeypot vm : Since booting a new honey-
pot VM takes too much time, the honeypot VM is live cloned from
a running VM. We modified the source code of the Xen hypervi-
sor in order to enable live cloning. In particular, live migration is
already supported by the Xen hypervisor [18]. This operation enables
the transfer of a running VM from a physical hardware component
to another physical hardware component only with minimal inter-
rupt (Section 2.3). We changed 180 source lines of code to enable live
cloning on the same physical hardware. Live cloning uses the itera-
tive copy procedures of live migration, but does not delete the source
VM as well as it maintains emulated hardware for both VMs.
Live migration copies the volatile memory, but it does not copy the
storage of the VM, which is usually located on a network file system.
However, creating a useful replica of a VM also includes copying the
storage. Since the storage of a VM can be very large with many GB of
data, a copy process would take too much time for our purposes. Our
goal is to extract and deploy a new honeypot in the range of seconds.
In order to reach this goal, we use the Linux logical volume man-
ager (lvm2) and create a “copy-on-write” virtual snapshot of the VM’s
storage during run-time. The virtual snapshot can be mounted on
the cloned VM even with read and write access. Before the cloned
VM can be used as a honeypot and the attacking source is redirected,
several adjustments need to be performed on the cloned VM. First,
the honeypot controller mounts and modifies the snapshot before as-
signing it to the cloned VM. It replaces the Linux shadow file with
a dummy shadow file in order to avoid the loss of real passwords
through successfully executed brute force or dictionary attacks. From
now on, it is not longer possible to log into the cloned VM by using
network services. This way, the controller can allow the continuation
of brute force or dictionary attacks which will never be successful on
the honeypot VM. Furthermore, the controller removes sensitive files
previously defined by the cloud customer. The controller deletes files
in the web directory which causes HTTP 404 replies once the scans
continue. However, the path and name of each deleted file is stored
in a list for later analysis and report generation. Finally, the extraction
procedure created a modified running cloned VM which we use as a
new honeypot VM.
Since the new honeypot VM maintains the same IP address as the
original VM, we need route the network packets of the attacking
source depending on their source IP address to the honeypot VM.
This way, we create the illusion for the attacker to communicate with
the original VM instead of the honeypot VM. Furthermore, outgo-
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ing traffic from the honeypot VM to an IP address which does not
belong to the identified attacking source and outgoing traffic from
the original VM targeting the attacking source needs to be blocked.
Other connections which belong to the normal work-flow and which
are not identified as malicious traffic are routed to the customer’s
original VM without any interruptions.
monitoring of the honeypot vm : Before enabling the dy-
namic honeypot service, the cloud customer needs to define certain
information in a configuration file. The configuration file defines the
directories containing the web content (for example /var/www/) and
which log files need to be monitored. The controller uses three dif-
ferent techniques to monitor the honeypot VM. First, the honeypot
controller uses VMI (Section 2.4) in order to transparently monitor
the volatile memory of the honeypot VM. The controller monitors the
list of running processes and loaded modules on the honeypot VM
including their corresponding PID. The controller immediately de-
tects modifications, for example if a new process is started or a new
module is loaded. Changes in these lists lead to the immediate termi-
nation of the honeypot VM. Second, the controller uses live forensic
techniques (Section 2.5) to examine the honeypot VM’s raw storage
(the virtual snapshot). The honeypot controller transparently extracts
relevant information about ongoing events on the honeypot VM from
known log files. This way, the controller investigates, for example
which usernames have been tried in brute force or dictionary attacks
as well as for which files the web server has been requested. Infor-
mation about the requested files is later used for comparison with
the list of deleted (but previously existing) files on the original VM.
Third, the controller uses the virtualized network device to monitor
the incoming and outgoing network traffic. After a defined period of
time, the honeypot VM is terminated and the allocated resources are
freed.
report generation : After termination of the honeypot VM, the
controller generates a report for the cloud customer. The report in-
cludes information about performed requests for files on the web
server. In particular, this information includes the requests which
would have been successful and would actually find a target file on
the original VM based on the comparison of the list of existing files
before deleting them from the web directory on the honeypot VM.
Furthermore, it includes information about the login attempts and
details about other incidences, for example, if a process was termi-
nated. In the following, an example report can be seen. The attacker
scanned for misconfigurations on the Web server and would have
found a default setup script which the customer may forgot to delete.
Furthermore, the attacker performs a dictionary attack against the
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SSH service. Most interestingly, the attacker sends data to the IMAP
port (143) and right after that a new bash shell process was started
which lead to the immediate termination of the honeypot VM.
<attack id="0701">
<alert>1</alert>
<timestamp>06/21/2012 00:37:00</timestamp>
<event>
<tcp>80</tcp>
<found>/cms/assets/setup.php</found>
</event>
<event>
<tcp>22</tcp>
<failed-login>root</failed-login>
<failed-login>mysql</failed-login>
</event>
<event>
<tcp>143</tcp>
<process>/bin/bash</process>
</event>
<info>Change file permissions on the web server
and immediately update the IMAP daemon.</info>
</attack>
With the help of the generated report, the customer can reveal mis-
configurations and vulnerabilities which an attacker could success-
fully exploit on the original VM. This is based on the fact that the
extracted honeypot VM runs exactly the same software in the same
configuration.
5.1.2.3 Evaluation of the Low-interactive Honeypot Service
For the evaluation of the proposed architecture, we used a modified
Xen hypervisor 4.1 and a server with an Intel(R) Xeon(R) Quad CPU
X3450 with 2.67 GHz and 4 GB of memory. The administrative VM
(dom0) runs Ubuntu Linux 10.04 (i386) and the customer VM runs
Ubuntu Linux 11.10 (i386). In our setup, creating a new lvm2 snap-
shot of the original VM’s storage which is assigned to the honeypot
VM is very fast (200± 45 ms) and does not depend on the size of the
original storage. Mounting the snapshot and replacing or deleting cer-
tain files (shadow file, file in the Web directory) can be performed in
the range of milliseconds as well. The time needed for the entire hon-
eypot extraction procedure is mostly influenced by the time required
for the live cloning process which iteratively copies the volatile mem-
ory of the original VM in order to create a consistent replica. Results
can be seen in Table 7. A honeypot VM cloned from an original VM
with 2 GB of memory can be live extracted, modified and deployed in
less than 7 seconds. This makes the proposed service feasible in realis-
tic scenarios since network attacks like dictionary attacks or scanning
for default files on a Web server usually need to be executed over
quite longer periods of time in order to be successful.
Due to the underlying live migration algorithm, the more memory
pages are modified during a copy procedure, the more copy iterations
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VM memory size 512 MB 1024 MB 2048 MB
timing 2.79± 0.17s 4.63± 0.29s 6.92± 0.64s
Table 7: Low-interactive honeypot VM extraction procedure for different
memory sizes. Average of 32 runs.
have to be performed. If the original VM is highly utilized, the live
cloning procedure can take more time. In order to improve this, we
modified the live migration algorithm and limit the number of per-
formed copy iterations to three. This results in a constantly fast live
cloning procedure even if the original VM of the cloud customer is
highly utilized.
In this section, we investigated how we can built a flexible low-
interactive honeypot service for cloud customers. In the next section,
we we design, implement and evaluate a high-interactive honeypot
service. In this context, triggering the system once an attacker has
already access to an original VM, removing sensitive data and con-
tinuously maintaining the illusion of the attacker to be still logged in
the original VM are of particular interest.
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5.1.3 High-interactive Honeypots for Attack Analysis
In this section, we present a security service that extracts a high-
interactive honeypot from the VM of a cloud customer. The extrac-
tion procedure is triggered once an attacker has already gained ac-
cess to the operating system. Once an intruder could be identified,
the intruder is extracted from the VM by cloning the VM and trans-
forming the cloned VM into a high-interactive honeypot VM running
co-residently on the same physical hardware. During this cloning pro-
cedure, sensitive data is removed or blocked from the VM’s memory
as well as from the VM’s storage. Thus, the new honeypot VM is a
replica which runs the same software in the same configuration but
without sensitive data. Most importantly, the established connection
of the intruder is not terminated, but is maintained and redirected.
Additionally, certain modifications are performed on the honeypot
VM in order to maintain the intruder’s illusion to be still located in
the original VM. Finally, the service transparently monitors the in-
truder’s actions and intentions. More precisely, we make the follow-
ing contributions:
• We developed a VM live cloning procedure which removes crit-
ical data and inserts essential administrative data “on-the-fly”.
An identified intruder is extracted into the cloned VM while
other logged-in users remain in the original VM. All established
remote connections are maintained, no connection is interrupted.
• We implemented several techniques to transform the cloned
VM into a unique high-interactive honeypot VM by executing
specific modifications depending on properties of the original
VM’s data. This way, we maintain the intruder’s illusion to be
still connected with the original VM.
• We monitor the new honeypot VM in order to understand the
intruder’s actions and intentions. The monitoring procedures
only use transparent techniques. There is no need to install ad-
ditional software on a customer’s VM which is protected by the
high-interactive honeypot service.
In the work of this section, we do not deal with detecting intru-
sions since this problem is complementary to our work and several
existing technologies for intrusion detection based on virtualization
technologies can be found ([29], [64]). Rather, we focus on the honey-
pot extraction, modification and monitoring procedures as well as on
the network management.
5.1.3.1 Intrusion Analysis
In this attack scenario, we assume an intruder who has already gained
access to a customer’s VM and who tries to escalate obtained privi-
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leges or investigates certain data on the compromised VM. In general,
gaining access to a remote operating system is often reached with the
help of performing two major attacks: Guessing or stealing valid lo-
gin credentials or remotely exploiting software vulnerabilities on the
target operating system. Brute force attacks targeting network ser-
vices like SSH are the most common attacks in computer networks.
Although there are a lot of approaches for fast detection [73], novel
prevention methods [82] or password generation methods [25], the
utilization of secure login credentials still remains an open problem.
In a study based on deployed honeypots, Jim Owens et al. [60] had
more than 400 brute force attacks on each machine on every single
day. Often, valid login credentials are even stolen directly from the
client with the help of phishing attacks [20]. Furthermore, a system
can also be compromised without the need for valid login credentials,
but by remotely exploiting software vulnerabilities with the help of
buffer-overflows, format string vulnerabilities and broken or risky im-
plemented authentication algorithms [23].
5.1.3.2 Architecture of the High-interactive Honeypot Service
The high-interactive honeypot service operates on the administrative
VM (dom0) located co-residently with other customer VM’s on a pyh-
sical hardware component. The different procedures which are se-
quentially executed by the service are illustrated in Figure 28.
Figure 28: Procedures of the high-interactive honeypot service isolating and
monitoring an intruder on-the-fly.
First, an intruder is detected in a customer VM and distinguished
from other users who can work on the same VM in parallel. The de-
tection of an intruder immediately triggers the VM live cloning pro-
cedure which finally results in a replica of the VM. During and after
the cloning procedure, the cloned VM is rapidly modified and trans-
formed into a high-interactive honeypot VM. Established connections
are maintained, the connection of the intruder is redirected to the hon-
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eypot VM without interruption and without influencing other users
on the original VM. Finally, the honeypot VM is precisely monitored
in order to obtain information about the intruder’s actions, intention
and potential vulnerabilities. After a defined lifetime, the honeypot
VM is destroyed, the intruder is banned from the network and a re-
port with specific information about the incident is generated and
sent to the customer.
intruder detection : In order to trigger the honeypot extrac-
tion procedure, an intruder has to be detected and distinguished
from all other users who do not have malicious intentions but who
can work on the same VM in parallel. The service periodically ex-
tracts the authentication log file from the original VM in order to
continuously match the IP addresses of established connection to the
logged-in users. For intrusion detection, the service monitors four
different points on a Xen hypervisor setup (Section 2.2) and contin-
uously retrieves real-time information about operations on the VM.
VMI (Section 2.4) is used to gather information about the running
processes and loaded modules. Live storage forensics are used to ex-
amine the raw storage of the VM by extracting meta information of
previously defined files to detect modifications. Furthermore, the ser-
vice retrieves information about the network traffic from the virtual-
ized network device as well as information about the VM’s resource
utilization from the hypervisor. The collected information can be used
to feed an arbitrary intrusion detection system to detect an intruder
and to trigger the honeypot extraction procedure.
The high-interactive honeypot extraction procedure consists of two
different phases: First, there is a cloning phase which creates a modi-
fied cloned VM from the original VM similar to the live cloning proce-
dure proposed in Section 5.1.2 in which we created a low-interactive
honeypot VM. The cloned VM runs the same software in the same
configuration but without sensitive data. Second, there is an adap-
tation phase which finally transforms the cloned VM into a unique
high-interactive honeypot VM.
vm live cloning : Once the extraction process is triggered, the
VM is live cloned during run-time. In order to reach this goal, we
modified the Xen live migration algorithm [18] to support live cloning
of a VM on the same physical hardware component (Section 2.3). Fig-
ure 29 depicts the phases of the live cloning approach. At the begin-
ning, the same iterative live migration algorithm is used, but slightly
modified to enable live cloning and the utilization of optimized pa-
rameters.
The honeypot service performs an additional last iteration in the
cloning procedure in order to perform certain modifications in the
volatile memory. The VM’s volatile memory may contain sensitive
65
Figure 29: The extensions added to the Xen live migration algorithm in or-
der to enable live cloning with modifications to create a high-
interactive honeypot VM.
data which needs to be removed. For example, if the Linux “sudo”
shell command was executed, it temporarily stores the plain root
password in the volatile memory. Furthermore, the Linux PAM mod-
ules (Pluggable Authentication Modules) store the Linux password
hashes of the users in the volatile memory. Sensitive data, even if it
is only a password hash, needs to be removed in the cloned VM’s
memory. An attacker who is logged-in the high-interactive honeypot
VM could retrieve the real password hashes and execute dictionary
attacks in order to reveal valid passwords. The service removes the
sensitive data with the help of regular expressions of previously de-
fined known patterns. A pattern Pc,l is a fingerprint of initial unique
characters c and the length l of the target sensitive data. The service
can remove arbitrary sensitive data in the volatile memory based on
multiple patterns Pc,l which can be defined in a configuration file.
Technically, removing data from the VM’s volatile memory means re-
placing the located sensitive data with dummy data having the same
length and characteristics. Additionally, the service can also insert
specifically prepared data into defined locations. In particular, it re-
places the root password hash in the cloned VM’s memory with a
previously defined hash during the modifying cloning process. The
replaced password hash allows the honeypot service to access the
cloned VM with a valid account after the procedure is finished.
In order to create a fully cloned VM, the service needs to add a
copy of the original VM’s storage to the replica. However, the storage
of the customer’s VM can be very large. Again, the service uses lvm2
snapshots like we used in the low-interactive honeypot architecture
described in Section 5.1.3, but this time it creates two snapshots of
the VM’s storage before the cloned VM is activated. The first snap-
shot is not used but required for later comparison in order to rapidly
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reveal new or deleted files on the honeypot VM. The second snapshot
is first modified and then added to the cloned VM. Files which are
not system-relevant or arbitrary files which are sensitive are blocked
by the service. To reach this goal, the service creates a linear lvm2
snapshot which matches the cloned VM’s storage sectors to the orig-
inal VM’s storage sectors but it blocks specific data by intentionally
setting IO errors on the corresponding sectors. This way, arbitrary
sensitive data can not be accessed on the snapshot after it is added
to the cloned VM. Since the storage can be very large, blocking the
sectors of sensitive files instead of deleting the files can be performed
much faster. Furthermore, the blocked files cannot be restored and
the operation cannot be undone from within the cloned VM. In the
standard configuration, the service blocks all files in the /home/, /tmp/
and the /root/ directory. Nevertheless, arbitrary directory paths can
be defined by the customer. The sectors on the storage on which the
sensitive files are located, have to be known to the service before
the cloning process is triggered. Starting to locate the sectors of the
sensitive files during extraction would take too much time and dra-
matically slow down the procedure. As a solution, the service contin-
uously monitors the sectors of the given sensitive files by periodically
examining the original VM’s raw storage with transparent storage
forensic techniques (Section 2.5). This way, it always maintains an
up-to-date list of files and their corresponding sectors on the storage.
Once an intruder is detected and the honeypot extraction procedure
is triggered, the sectors of the sensitive files which have to be blocked
during the cloning process are already known. After sensitive files
have been blocked, their names and absolute paths are stored by the
service in a list L. Later, the list is used for custom-made adaptation
and transformation of the cloned VM into a unique high-interactive
honeypot VM.
Finally, the live cloning procedure results in a cloned VM without
sensitive data in the volatile memory, without the opportunity to ac-
cess sensitive files on the storage and with an additionally inserted
root account that gives access to the service. However, the original
VM and the cloned VM maintain the same MAC address and the
same IP address. Fine-grained network management needs to be per-
formed in order to distinguish the logged-in users from the logged-in
intruder, but first the cloned VM needs to be transformed into a high-
interactive honeypot VM.
transformation of the clone : The service transforms the
cloned VM into a high-interactive honeypot VM which should be able
to reveal the actions and the intentions of the intruder, but should
not arouse the intruder’s suspicion to be fooled. The final step in the
transformation of the cloned VM requires several adaptations specifi-
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cally made to maintain the intruder’s illusion to be still located in the
original VM. For the adaptations, the inserted root account is used.
Until now, the service modified the cloned VM’s volatile memory
as well as it blocked sectors of sensitive files on its storage. However,
on the storage, the original password hashes can still be found in the
Linux shadow file and refreshing the Linux page cache would simply
replace the modifications in the volatile memory with the original
data. In order to avoid this, the service replaces the file with a new
shadow file defining dummy password hashes for accounts and the
same root password hash previously used for account insertion in
the volatile memory. Furthermore, the service also terminates and
removes running processes which are unwanted on the honeypot VM
(for example backup processes). The names of the processes can be
defined in the configuration file. Finally, the service drops the cloned
VM’s memory cache. At this point in time, every critical and sensitive
data is either completely removed or blocked.
For further adaptations, the service modifies three popular shell
tools which belong to the GNU Coreutils4 and the GNU Findutils5.
These modifications depend on the list of blocked files L created by
the service during the cloning process. The service creates new ver-
sions of the ls, cat and find tools especially for the honeypot VM. The
modifications maintain the illusion that the blocked files of L still ex-
ist and they prevent the intruder receiving IO errors when using these
commands on the blocked files.
The modifications of these three commands help to get information
about the intentions of the intruder and to maintain the intruder’s
illusion to be still located in the original VM. The service can reveal
if the intruder had a primary target, for example if the intruder tried
to find specific files. The service creates a second list Lr containing a
new random name for each file stored in L generated with an English
dictionary. In detail, the performed modifications on the shell tools
are as follows:
• ls: The service modifies the source code of the directory listing
command ls which finally does not display the names of the
files contained in L if requested, but instead displays the cor-
responding new file name stored in Lr in the same directory.
This way, sensitive information which can be contained in the
real file names are removed. However, the hierarchy of the real
file system is maintained and used to monitor if the intruder
searches for specific information.
• cat: Since the modified ls shell command displays new file names
for the removed files in L, but the real data of these files cannot
be accessed, the service also modifies the sources of the cat com-
4 http://www.gnu.org/software/coreutils/coreutils.html
5 http://www.gnu.org/software/findutils/findutils.html
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mand which displays newly generated content once a file of Lr
is accessed which actually does not exist but can be listed with
the modified ls command. Once the modified cat shell command
is executed, it immediately downloads, filters and displays the
text content of a randomly selected Wikipedia article.
• find: Searching for and finding files which do not exist is en-
abled by modifications in the find shell command. A modified
version of the find command actually creates the files for which
the intruder searches in a randomly selected directory.
The unique modified sources depend on L and Lr and they are
newly compiled each time a new honeypot VM is created and they
are inserted before the Linux page cache is refreshed. Of course, more
shell commands can be modified to provoke actions of the intruder
as well as shell commands which the intruder should not execute can
be removed.
Finally, if all steps are successfully executed, the transformation of
the cloned VM into a custom-made high-interactive honeypot VM
is finished. The established connection of the intruder can now be
redirected by the service to the new honeypot VM.
connection management : Connection management is a very
important step in establishing the new high-interactive honeypot VM.
The intruder who already has gained access to the original VM main-
tains an established remote connection which should not be inter-
rupted. An interruption of the connection would raise the intruder’s
suspicion that something went wrong. Furthermore, the network ac-
tivity of other normally logged-in users on the original VM should
not be affected by our procedures. Since both systems, the original
VM and the new honeypot VM, maintain the same IP address, this
step is not easy to implement.
We designed the following networking setup: During the cloning
and transformation process, all traffic from and to the cloned VM is
blocked. Once the honeypot VM is finally created, traffic is diverted
based on the source IP addresses. Traffic from the intruder’s IP ad-
dress is rerouted to the honeypot VM, while the remaining traffic (for
example the traffic of other logged-in users who work on the origi-
nal VM in parallel) is still routed to the original VM. Since there are
open network connections of the intruder on the original VM as well
as open connections of other users on the honeypot VM, the outgo-
ing traffic of both VMs needs to be precisely managed. If any errors
occur, packets of connection timeouts could interfere and interrupt
established connections. Outgoing traffic from the original VM to the
intruder is dropped and outgoing traffic from the honeypot VM to
other users is dropped as well. Figure 30 shows two normal users
communicating with the original VM while the detected intruder is
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routed to the honeypot VM. In both cases, outgoing traffic of the other
VM is blocked to prevent connection errors.
Figure 30: Connection management and redirection of the intruder to the
honeypot VM while not affecting others on the original VM.
It might be required that the intruder can also communicate with
other hosts on the Internet, for example to download additional ex-
ploits from a third party server, or that malware can communicate
with a command and control server. For such setups, we decided to
use the following strategy: The honeypot VM is allowed to communi-
cate with other destinations besides the intruder. Only certain hosts
internally used by the cloud as database servers, replicated storage
or backup servers are excluded, because such communication could
cause data inconsistency and disrupt the operation of the original
VM. However, existing outgoing connections, being established be-
fore the cloning process are not allowed and corresponding packets
are dropped. For new connections, the masquerading feature of the
Linux networking stack is used and these connections are mapped
to a new IP address. Without masquerading, both VMs might choose
the same source and destination port numbers to communicate with
a remote server, which could not be correctly handled. These prop-
erties are implemented on the virtualized network device of the Xen
hypervisor setup. In addition to these static rules, dynamic limits as
the rate of new SMTP connections preventing the intruder starting to
send spam emails or the total bandwidth preventing denial of service
attacks can be also deployed.
Finally, after the high-interactive honeypot VM is created and the
connection management is executed, the intruder is already extracted
from the original VM since the intruder’s presence is now isolated
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and located on the honeypot VM. From the intruder’s perspective,
this procedure is hardly noticeable because there is no connection
interruption nor any other obvious signs on the system. The intruder
is sill connected with a VM running the same software in the same
configuration.
honeypot monitoring : Once the honeypot VM is successfully
created and the intruder is redirected, the honeypot VM is transpar-
ently monitored by the service to reveal the intruder’s course of ac-
tions. Basically, it uses the same transparent monitoring techniques
which are also used in Section 5.1.2, but it collects more details. The
services used VMI as well as live storage forensics, information from
the Xen hypervisor and from the virtualized network devices.
The honeypot VM is only deployed for a previously defined life-
time in which it is precisely monitored. The service continuously re-
trieves and stores the following information as long as the honeypot
VM is deployed:
• System: The service periodically retrieves a timestamped list
of running processes by accessing the honeypots VM’s memory
via VMI (Section 2.4). It also gathers their uid, pid and used argu-
ments as well as a timestamped list of loaded kernel modules by
walking the kernel’s module list. New started or terminated pro-
cesses or modules are identified in chronological order. Further-
more, the service transparently retrieves a list of currently open
network sockets and logs the Linux message buffer (dmesg).
• Files: The service continuously extracts certain configuration
files by examining the raw storage with live storage forensic
techniques (Section 2.5). The service periodically computes a
hash over the data of these files and this way it can immedi-
ately reveal modifications in chronological order. Furthermore,
it continuously extracts and stores the shell history files for later
analysis of the entered shell commands. If the intruder cleans
the log files, the information is already stored outside the hon-
eypot VM.
• Communication: The service records all data sent and received
by the honeypot VM over the network including protocols, ports
and destination IP addresses.
analysis and reporting : The general idea of the proposed
high-interactive honeypot service is to analyze what kind of actions
an intruder has performed and what intentions the intruder may had.
In order to support the original VM’s customer in investigating the
incident, the service generates a report based on the analysis of the
collected data. The report contains relevant information about the in-
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cident and the modifications on the honeypot VM in detail and in
chronological order.
Once the lifetime of the honeypot VM is exceeded, the service de-
stroys the honeypot VM and bans the intruder from the cloud net-
work. In order to reveal new files or deleted files on the honeypot VM,
the service compares the snapshot of the storage which was assigned
to the honeypot VM with the second backup snapshot also created
during the cloning procedure. This way, new, deleted and modified
files can be rapidly revealed.
As an additional feature which can be used for investigation, the
service tries to identify the intention of the intruder based on the
collected information. For this, we defined three different intention
classes and the service classifies the intruder to one intention depend-
ing on the recorded activity:
• Investigation: The intruder searched for specific information on
the compromised system. Further investigations can also reveal
if the intruder already had previous insider information about
the system or an institution.
• Misusage: The intruder manipulated the system for its own pur-
poses to perform further malicious activities. For example, the
intruder deployed software which is used for further attacks
against other systems.
• Malfunction: The intruder tried to destroy the system or to in-
tentionally collapse the system by causing malfunctions.
In order to classify the intention of an intruder, the service creates
a feature vector V from the collected information. V consists of the
sub-vectors {Vs,Vf,Vt,Vc}. Vs contains the number of new started
unknown processes and new loaded modules. Vf contains the num-
ber of new created files, the number of modified files as well as the
number of deleted files. Vt contains the amount of incoming traffic
to the honeypot VM in bytes as wells as the amount of outgoing traf-
fic and the number of contacted remote source IP addresses. Finally,
Vc contains the number of the executions of the ls, cd and cat shell
commands and the number of the file name which was entered the
most. The service generates V and classifies this vector to one of the
intention classes by using a heuristic approach based on statically
implemented rules. We defined simple classification rules based on
a number of performed experiments. The resulting probabilities are
added to the report and can help to decide if further manual investi-
gations are required or they can give a quick overview to the cloud
customer.
The service generates a report for the VM’s customer based on the
recorded and analyzed data collected on the honeypot VM. The re-
port reveals potential risks and vulnerabilities as well as which soft-
ware patches should be installed. Table 8 shows an example report
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after analysis based on an incident triggered by an intruder who ob-
tained valid login credentials for the “foobar” account.
honeypot report #3
intruder detected 23:54 - 5/7/2013
accessed honeytoken
honeypot lifetime 00:04 - 6/7/2013
compromised account foobar
source IP address (anonymized)
generated traffic 130718 bytes
dst IP address contacts (anonymized)
(anonymized)
started processes (4)
buf -offset 128
buf -offset 512
turtle -hide -amd64
obfuscate -s ubuntu -a foobar
new files (2)
/tmp/expl.tar.gz
/tmp/tools.tar.gz
modified files (3)
/etc/shadow
/var/log/wtmp
/var/log/auth.log
intruder intentions
5% investigation
80% misusage
15% maloperation
Table 8: Example report after an intruder was monitored, the collected data
was analyzed and the honeypot VM was destroyed.
The report shows the point in time the intruder was detected and
the mechanism used for detection (“honeytoken”). To get an insight
into what actually happened on the honeypot VM during its lifetime,
the report shows unknown started processes, newly created files and
modified files. Finally, based on the recorded data, the probability for
each of the three intention classes is added to the report.
5.1.3.3 Evaluation of the High-interactive Honeypot Service
The high-interactive honeypot security service is implemented for
Linux for a Xen hypervisor setup 4.1 (Section 2.2) operating in routing
mode. We modified 248 lines of code on the Xen hypervisor code in
order to implement the modifying live cloning procedure. The service
is programmed in Python with 1307 lines of code. The service uses
fine-grained VMI (Section 2.4) and a modified version of the Volatil-
ity6 forensic framework which has been extended by specific plugins
6 http://code.google.com/p/volatility/
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tailored towards our purposes. Live storage forensic techniques are
used in order to transparently examine the raw storage during run-
time (Section 2.5). Customer VMs use an ext3 file system and lvm2
volumes for storage which allows the service to create live snapshots.
For an evaluation, we used an Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU with
3 Ghz and 4 GB of memory. We investigated the honeypot extraction
procedure and the different transparent monitoring techniques.
cloning and transformation : We focused on the honeypot
extraction procedures and only implemented a simple but effective
intruder detection approach. If an attacker has gained access to the
VM, for example based on a successful dictionary attack, the service
detects the intruder as follows: We create executable files which have
interesting names but actually no effect on the customer VM’s file
system. We call these files “honeytokens”. A honeytoken can attract a
curious intruder and detection of the intruder accessing the honeyto-
ken reveals her and triggers the honeypot extraction procedure. This
approach is quite simple, but effective, since we can store a greater
number of honeytokens on different locations on the file system.
In order to determine the overhead of the proposed modifying live
cloning process which removes sensitive data and inserts a root ac-
count on the cloned VM, we deploy a customer VM on which the
password hashes of three different user accounts, the plain root pass-
word stored by the sudo shell tool and a private key (256 bit) needs to
be located and removed from the volatile memory. Figure 31 shows
normal live cloning processes without our modifications in compari-
son to the live cloning process performed by our service which uses
an additional iteration in order to scan the volatile memory and re-
place sensitive data.
The measurements depend on the current utilization of the cus-
tomer’s VM. Figure 31 shows the cloning process during high mem-
ory utilization without memory modifications in comparison to a live
cloning process during high memory utilization. Our modifications
generate an average overhead of around 20%, of course increasing
with increasing amount of the original VM’s memory.
The service periodically retrieves the corresponding sectors of given
sensitive files on the customer VM’s raw storage (for example in
/home/, /var/lib/, /tmp/ and /root/). The service continuously monitors
these files during normal operation even if there is no intruder in
order to respond quickly if an intruder could be identified and sensi-
tive files have to be blocked rapidly. Retrieving the sectors of files on
the storage once an intruder was detected would dramatically slow
down the honeypot creation procedure, because the number of sec-
tors of the sensitive data can be very large. In our setup, the service
retrieves the sectors of 50 different files which are all located in differ-
ent directories in 3.1± 0.1 seconds (207294 single sectors). The service
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Figure 31: Duration of standard live cloning in comparison to live cloning
with our proposed memory modifications (30 test-runs).
maintains an up-to-date list of the corresponding sectors. If a new
cloning procedure is started, a list of the sectors is already available
and they can be rapidly blocked on the new storage snapshot created
for the cloned VM.
The creation of the custom-made shell tools require different modi-
fications in their source code each time a new honeypot VM is created.
Creating unique coreutils and findutils depending on the number of
blocked files can be seen in Table 9. The new modified shell tools can
be created and deployed in around 2.0± 0.1 seconds. The procedure
can run in parallel to the cloning procedure.
description timing
unique coreutils adaption and creation 0.988± 0.143 s
unique findutils adaption and creation 0.342± 0.071 s
insertion into cloned VM 0.642± 0.117 s
synchronizing the Linux page cache 0.107± 0.005 s
Table 9: Adaptation of shell tools for a new honeypot VM (30 test-runs).
Finally, redirecting the intruder to the new honeypot VM while
maintaining the established connections of other users and deploying
several specific firewall rules to block traffic from the original VM to
the intruder as well as from the honeypot VM to the normal users can
be rapidly achieved in 53.53± 2.17 ms. In our test-runs, the intruder
was never able to notice the extraction procedure and his relocation
to a new honeypot VM.
All in all, cloning the original VM with modifications, transform-
ing the cloned VM into a custom-made unique honeypot VM by re-
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placing shell tools and rerouting an intruder can be performed in
approximately 7 seconds depending on the current workload of the
customer’s VM (512MB memory). This period of time is little enough
to prevent the intruder from deep investigations on the original VM.
honeypot vm monitoring : Once the new extracted honeypot
VM was successfully deployed and the intruder is redirected, the hon-
eypot VM is continuously monitored in order to record and analyze
the intruder’s actions. Table 10 shows timings of the periodic execu-
tion of different transparent monitoring techniques.
retrieved information required time source
processes and modules 1.55± 0.004s VMI
bash history 0.23± 0.003s storage forensics
system config files (7) and SHA1 0.83± 0.007s storage forensics
system log files (6) 0.41± 0.005s storage forensics
network information 0.17± 0.002s hypervisor
resource utilization 0.14± 0.003s hypervisor
Table 10: Timings of the periodically and transparently executed tasks in
order to monitor the honeypot VM (30 test-runs).
Retrieving information about running processes, their correspond-
ing pid and uid, and about loaded kernel modules takes approxi-
mately 1.5 seconds for more than 70 different processes and 20 loaded
modules on the honeypot VM. Retrieving the bash_history file takes
approximately 0.2 seconds, retrieving 7 essential system configura-
tion files and computing and comparing their hash values to reveal
modifications takes approximately 0.8 seconds. Retrieving informa-
tion about 6 exemplary log files located on the honeypot VM’s raw
storage using the live forensic techniques takes approximately 0.4
seconds. Retrieving information from the virtualized network device
about established connections and their destinations takes approxi-
mately 0.2 seconds and information from the hypervisor about cur-
rent resource utilization approximately 0.1 seconds. Since several of
these processes can run in parallel, all required information from a
running honeypot VM which is used to analyze the intruders actions
can be transparently and periodically retrieved in approximately 1.6
seconds. The resulting timings show the feasibility of our proposed
high-interactive honeypot service which can beneficially be deployed
by cloud customers in order to analyze attacks against their specific
software setups.
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5.2 attacker trapping on the process-level
In the first security service proposed in Chapter 5, we used virtualiza-
tion technologies in order to create a replica of a customer VM which
we finally transformed into a honeypot VM. Creating a separated
environment with the help of a newly cloned VM has several advan-
tages, like for example the availability of an entire isolated operating
system. Assigning a separated VM to an attacker is quite resource-
consuming, but very beneficial for analysis and easy to implement
in an IaaS cloud (Section 1.4). However, this strategy fits not well in
every scenario.
In this section, we briefly show a light-weight strategy for attack
analysis also based on software virtualization [4]. Our approach is
especially interesting for an “Software-as-a-Service” (SaaS) business
model, in which single applications are hosted in the cloud and pro-
vided to customers, but it can be also used in an IaaS cloud. In this
context, we do not use an entire hypervisor setup, but we use soft-
ware virtualization on the application layer with the help of Linux
Containers (LXC7) and the Checkpoint and Restore In Userspace pro-
ject (CRIU8). LXC runs arbitrary Linux processes in virtual containers
within the userspace of a Linux operating system. The CRIU project
enables checkpoint and restore functionality for processes, which al-
lows to create a synchronous dump of a target running process. Sub-
sequently, we can restore the dumped process in a separated envi-
ronment realized as a virtual LXC container. Figure 32 illustrates the
architecture which clones a process into a separated LXC environ-
ment triggered and managed by a remote controller which addition-
ally functions as a reverse proxy. Using this approach, we can trap a
detected attacker whose connection is currently handled by a process
and analyze the further course of actions.
The proposed architecture is quite similar to the proposed honey-
pot security services presented in Section 5.1 which are based on a
Xen hypervisor setup. However, this time we only clone a single pro-
cess within the same userspace of an operating system. This brings
the advantage that the procedure can be performed faster while it
also requires less resources. In the first step of Figure 32, the at-
tacker is identified. In step two, the cloning procedure is triggered
and executed within the same userspace. In step three, the attacker
is rerouted to the new cloned process managed by a reverse proxy
while already established connections are not interrupted.
In our exemplary scenario, the process is an Apache2 web server
and an attacker tries to exploit a known software vulnerability which
has already been patched. In particular, the service is triggered by a
manipulated security patch which we called “honey-patch”. A honey-
7 https://linuxcontainers.org/
8 https://criu.org
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Figure 32: Architecture of the proposed fine-grained attacker trapping mech-
anism based on light-weight software virtualization.
patch closes a software vulnerability, like traditional security patches
do, however, it additionally triggers the cloning procedure and the
reverse proxy to redirected the attacker to a new replica which then
allows the exploitation. Subsequently, the cloned Apache2 process
is used as an isolated honeypot to investigate the attacker’s further
capabilities, strategies and intentions.
5.2.1 Fine-Grained Memory Redaction
An attacker who successfully exploited a vulnerability can eventually
retrieve sensitive information, for example about sessions of other
clients stored in the volatile memory of the cloned process. In the
exemplary Apache2 web server scenario, sensitive information are
for example the IP address or the request history of other clients.
Especially information about encrypted connections is sensitive, since
it can be used for other attacks, for example for Man-in-the-Middle
attacks.
To solve this issue, we introduced a memory redaction procedure
that replaces client session data with forged anonymous data.
Apache2 stores client sessions in well-defined data structures, for
example the request_rec struct variable stores information about each
request a specific client made:
struct request_rec {
...
/** The connection to the client */
conn_rec *connection;
...
/** First line of request */
char *the_request;
...
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char *useragent_ip;
};
With the help of certain known and fixed values also stored in
the struct, our service can rapidly locate each stored client session in
the raw memory with the help of appropriate regular expressions. It
overwrites identified sensitive data with anonymous data which has
exactly the same length as well as the same characteristics. For exam-
ple, if an IP address in the request_rec needs to be anonymized, the
service replaces the stored string with a new string having the same
length, but also being a valid IP address. This is an important step
since our architecture should not corrupt the cloned Apache2 process
and its further execution. In particular, we replace information like
the type of the performed request (e.g. GET or POST), the request
string and the source IP address in every request_rec. Of course, the
stored session of the attacker is not replaced with forged anonymous
data. Moreover, depending on the setup, Apache2’s SSLConnRec and
modssl_ctx_t struct can be anonymized using the same strategy.
5.2.2 Results of an Implementation
We implemented the security service and the redaction procedure
as a final step before the cloned process is restored by CRIU. In
order to accelerate the proposed memory redaction procedure, we
only analyze specific regions of Apache2’s memory. By investigating
Apache2’s source code, we could narrow down the memory regions
in which the target information is stored to the heap, the stack and
anonymously mapped memory regions.
Extracting an attacker from the original Apache2 process into a
cloned and isolated Apache2 process causes performance overhead.
In our evaluation, we triggered the honeypatch with malicious re-
quests and measured the overhead of individual requests. The pro-
posed memory redaction strategy operates rapidly since it exploits
the fact that Apache2 stores client session data in known and well-
defined structs. Our evaluation showed that malicious HTTP requests
cause a constant overhead of approximately 0.25 seconds in compari-
son to benign requests. However, this overhead only impacts detected
attackers and does not influence other clients. The overhead is min-
imal and makes our proposed security service feasible for realistic
environments, because the cloning, redaction and redirection proce-
dures operate fast and this way they do not interrupt actions of an
attacker nor they are recognizable. This section briefly showed how
dynamically deployed honeypot environments can be realized on a
more fine-grained and resource saving way with the help of software
virtualization in the userspace of an operating system.
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5.3 summary
In this chapter, we proposed two different transparent security ser-
vices which can be used to analyze ongoing attacks.
First, we proposed the extraction of a low-interactive honeypot VM
from a customer VM (Section 5.1.2). We detect ongoing attacks in ini-
tial phases and rapidly extract a honeypot VM from a customer VM
which is the target of the attack. The deployed new honeypot VM pro-
vides the same network applications in exactly the same up-to-date
configuration. This way, the impact of the detected ongoing attack
can be monitored and vulnerabilities which would have threaten the
original VM can be revealed and analyzed while sensitive data re-
mains secured. The architecture deceives and misleads an attacker
but does not influence the normal work-flow of the original customer
VMs. Based on a defined reporting format, cloud customers can learn
from attacks and discover unknown vulnerabilities. We showed the
design of the architecture, we presented details about the implemen-
tation and we evaluated the extraction and monitoring procedures.
The evaluation showed that timely extraction of a new honeypot is
feasible and realistic.
Second, we assumed an intruder who has already gained access
to a customer VM. Once the intruder has been detected, we create
a high-interactive honeypot VM from the original compromised VM
and “extract” the intruder during run-time (Section 5.1.3). We imple-
mented a VM live cloning process which removes sensitive data from
the VM’s volatile memory, inserts administrative data and blocks sen-
sitive files on the VM’s storage “on-the-fly”. The cloned VM is finally
transformed into a unique and custom-made high-interactive honey-
pot VM by deploying modified shell tolls in order to maintain the
intruder’s illusion to be still located in the original VM. During the
extraction procedure, established connections of the attacker as well
as of potential users logged-in in parallel are maintained. The eval-
uation showed that we can create a new high-interactive honeypot
VM in approximately 6 seconds and periodically retrieve various in-
formation by transparently monitoring different points on the hon-
eypot VM in steps of 1.6 seconds. The proposed service aggregates
the collected information and generates a report for the original VM’s
owner in order to give a quick overview on the incident. It also an-
alyzes the intruder’s intentions. With our high-interactive honeypot
service, new dimensions can be reached in terms of fooling attackers
and researching their malicious actions and intentions.
In the last security service of this chapter, we briefly proposed a
more light-weight approach in order to transparently analyze ongo-
ing attacks in a cloned and isolated process environment (Section 5.2).
We created separated virtualized Linux containers within a userspace
and used them to deploy a replica of a process which we created and
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restored during run-time. An attacker is detected with the help of
honeypatches and redirected to the cloned process which has been
redacted by removing sensitive data from its memory. The cloned
process is monitored and the course of actions performed by the at-
tacker is analyzed without interrupting the original process. We im-
plemented the service for the Apache2 web server and an evaluation
showed the feasibility of our approach since there is only a minimal
overhead.
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6
T R A N S PA R E N T AT TA C K M I T I G AT I O N
In the previous Chapters 4 and 5, we proposed transparent security
services which detect and which analyze ongoing attacks in the IaaS
cloud. In this chapter, we introduce two different transparent cloud
security services which mitigate attacks. The first service dynamically
isolates and securely stores sensitive data “on-the-fly” (Section 6.1)
and the second service computes and implements custom-made se-
curity settings for the applications of cloud customers (Section 6.2).
Both services operate in a pro-active fashion and use active VMI (Sec-
tion 2.4) in order to manipulate the data of customer VMs during
run-time.
6.1 dynamic isolation of sensitive data
As already mentioned in Section 1.2, flaws in software, for example in
the memory management, are present in the cloud in the same man-
ner as in traditional computer networks. Attackers can remotely ex-
ploit software vulnerabilities, for example in the network applications
of customers, and this way circumvent authentication mechanisms in
order to get access to the operating system and to spy on critical or
sensitive data. Especially, stolen data like passwords or secret keys
can be used in further attacks and cause damage on a large scale. For
example, the famous Stuxnet [24] malware used digital certificates
stolen from the systems of a hardware manufacturer in order to in-
sert correctly signed driver modules into infected operating systems.
Its successor, a malware called Flame [75], even used stolen digital
certificates issued by Microsoft. Obviously, small sensitive data can
be a worthwhile target for Cyber attacks.
In this security service, we focus on securing sensitive data located
in the volatile memory of customer VMs. Our approach is based on a
fact which greatly helps to develop a mechanism mitigating the prob-
ability of sensitive data being stolen: Sensitive data is in the majority
of cases only required for small periods of time, while most of the
time it is stored unused in the volatile memory of a running process,
ready for access. A process uses the sensitive data once specific events
are triggered which finally require the sensitive data (for example an
authentication sub-procedure). Unfortunately, successfully executed
attacks can bypass permission mechanisms of operating systems and
simply retrieve the sensitive data from the process.
As a solution to this problem, we propose a transparent security
service which securely stores known sensitive data in a co-resident
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trusted VM (dom0) and only temporarily inserts the data into a cus-
tomer VM to the exact location of use as long as it is required – and
not longer. In particular, sensitive data is only inserted into the cus-
tomer VM’s volatile memory if certain previously defined integrity
conditions could be verified. This way, the service greatly minimizes
the probability of sensitive data being stolen by an attacker who suc-
cessfully exploits vulnerabilities in order to bypass permission mech-
anisms. The proposed service benefits from the transparent perspec-
tive enabled by virtualization technologies (Section 2.3) and uses fine-
grained VMI (Section 2.4). In comparison to the proposed security
services of Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, VMI is this time not only used
to transparently read certain information from the memory but also
to write data to specific locations during run-time.
6.1.1 Architecture of the Isolation Service
The security service operates on the administrative VM (dom0) in a
Xen hypervisor setup (Section 2.2). It dynamically isolates sensitive
data of a customer’s VM which co-residently runs on the same hard-
ware component. To reach this goal, certain information need to be
defined. The process name which uses the sensitive data (and runs
on the customer’s VM) and a characteristic fingerprint of the sensi-
tive data to find its exact location need to be known. Furthermore,
the service requires the definition of an event which triggers the tem-
porary insertion of the removed sensitive data into the customer VM.
For example, this event can simply be a new incoming TCP connec-
tion to a specific port on the operating system. Finally, a list of files
and processes need to be defined. The integrity of these files and pro-
cesses is verified by the service before insertion is allowed.
Basically, the proposed security service operates in seven sequential
steps which are illustrated in Figure 33. The first step is an initial step
and is executed only once.
In the first step, the service locates the allocated memory pages of
the target process running in the customer VM. It searches for the
exact location of sensitive data within these memory pages by gen-
erating a regular expression with the help of a characteristic unique
fingerprint in the second step. Once the exact location of the sensi-
tive data could be identified, the data is rapidly replaced by dummy
data which has the same characteristics and exactly the same size.
In this context, characteristics can be the format of the data or meta
information of a file type. For example, if a key is isolated which in-
cludes certain specific meta information, the generated dummy key
also needs to have valid meta information. The original sensitive data
is securely stored in the administrative VM (dom0) which we assume
as being trusted. Since the memory pages of the target process are
continuously allocated and freed, the location of the dummy data
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Figure 33: Steps of the security service which dynamically isolates sensitive
data from a process running in a customer VM.
may change during the continuing execution of the process. Thus, in
the third step, the proposed service periodically monitors the position
of the inserted dummy data, again, with the help of the characteristic
fingerprint. This way, the service continuously maintains the correct
location of the dummy data in the volatile memory.
Once an event is triggered by a procedure of the process which
immediately requires the original sensitive data, the service first de-
lays the requesting procedure in step four. It verifies the integrity of
the customer’s VM before it temporarily replaces the dummy data by
the original sensitive data in step five. In step six, the procedure of
the process requiring the sensitive data is allowed to continue. Once
the procedure is finished, the sensitive data is again replaced by new
dummy data in step seven and the loop can start again waiting for the
next requesting event.
In order to verify the customer’s software platform before inser-
tion is allowed, the service continuously retrieves certain information
from four different points in the Xen hypervisor setup (Section 2.2).
The service transparently retrieves information of currently running
processes on the operating system using VMI (Section 2.4). It exam-
ines the VM’s raw storage by extracting certain meta data of files
using live storage forensic techniques (Section 2.5). Furthermore, it
can retrieve information about the VM’s network traffic from the vir-
tualized network device as well as information about currently used
memory and CPU performance from the hypervisor.
As already mentioned, verification of the operating system before
the sensitive data is inserted is performed by verifying the integrity
of stored files and running processes. These files need to be defined
by the customer depending on it’s operating system and installed
applications. Integrity is measured by computing a hash over the data,
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either over the data of a file located on the raw storage (Section 2.5)
or over the data of the executable (ELF) code of a running process
stored in the volatile memory (Section 4.1.1). Integrity is verified by
comparing the hashes with white-listed hashes securely stored in the
administrative VM (dom0). Once the integrity of the customer’s VM
could be verified, the service temporarily injects the original sensitive
data into the location of use.
6.1.2 Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented a prototype of the security service for Linux. Its ar-
chitecture is illustrated in Figure 34. The administrative VM (dom0 )
acts as the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) and uses a vTPM [10] cou-
pled with a hardware TPM. It runs Linux and our security service
which can transparently read from and write to the volatile memory
pages of a co-resident customer VM on the same physical hardware.
The customer VM runs processes requiring small sensitive data un-
der certain circumstances (e.g. a secret key in an authentication pro-
cedure). The event triggering the insertion can be a new incoming
remote connection to a specific port of the customer’s operating sys-
tem. In this context, an authentication procedure of a remote client
can be easily delayed simply by delaying the network packets on the
virtual network device.
Figure 34: Architecture of the proposed security service which operates on
a trusted VM (dom0) and dynamically isolates sensitive data of a
process running on a co-resident customer VM.
We evaluated a scenario in which the proposed security service
can be beneficially deployed. For this practical evaluation, we used
an Intel(R) Core(TM) 2 Duo CPU with 3 Ghz and 4 GB of memory
running the Xen hypervisor (Section 2.2). We deployed the service on
the administrative VM running Ubuntu Linux 12.04.
The security service monitored a VM with 1024 MB memory run-
ning in parallel on the same physical hardware. The VM was vir-
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tualized in HVM mode (“fully-virtualized”) and run Ubuntu Linux
12.04. Additionally, the customer’s VM run a SSH-server which al-
lows secure remote access based on password authentication. In the
evaluation, we treated the Linux password hashes (SHA512) as sensi-
tive data which are continuously stored in the VM’s volatile memory
by the Linux Pluggable Authentication Module (PAM). The hashes
are required for each Linux authentication procedure, but ending up
in the wrong hands, the plain-text password could be ascertained
with the help of a locally executed brute-force or dictionary attack in
a high-performance hardware setup. Table 11 shows results of time
measurements for the different procedures of our proposed service
(100 runs).
procedure of the security service mean std
locate (original/dummy) password hash 3.10 s 0.22 s
replace (original/dummy) password hash 0.02 s 0.01 s
verify integrity of 32 files (locating and SHA256 hash) 1.68 s 0.23 s
verify integrity of 8 processes (locating ELF and SHA256 hash) 2.42 s 0.31 s
Table 11: Timings of the different procedures of the security service which
dynamically isolates sensitive data.
Since locating the target password hashes and verifying the in-
tegrity of the operating system can run in parallel, an average SSH
login procedure secured with our transparent security service took
approximately 4.1 seconds while a standard SSH login procedure
without our service took approximately 1.2 seconds in our setup. The
proposed service causes an acceptable overhead, since it only delays
the establishment of a new connection for approximately 3 seconds
before the login credentials are requested from the new user. No fur-
ther network packets of the same connection need to be delayed. By
storing the hashes in a secured trusted environment and only insert-
ing them once the integrity of the system is measured and only for
a very short period of time for an authentication, the service greatly
mitigates probability of the hashes being stolen. Most importantly, the
proposed service operates generically which means every operating
system and every application can be supported.
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6.2 hot-hardening
In the second transparent security service in the field of attack miti-
gation, we again use active VMI in order to modify the data of pro-
cesses operating in customer VMs. We focus on the continuous im-
provement of security-related configuration settings of applications.
Configuration settings which are not well-chosen, not correctly ap-
plied or too weak can lead to security breaches and loss of sensitive
information. For example, allowing short passwords while not limit-
ing the number of login attempts makes systems vulnerable to brute
force or dictionary attacks. Often, customer-selected security settings
are lax and do not fit well into the appropriate scenario. On the other
hand, strong and static security settings can be perceived as being
cumbersome since they can drastically decrease usability. In the worst
case, they can even cause users to become annoyed and motivated
to disable or circumvent the settings. For example recall the famous
anecdote about people writing down complex passwords on a memo
mounted on the computer display.
For this work, we analyzed configuration settings of 28 popular
Linux networking applications. An average application has 43 differ-
ent settings while 17 of these settings are related to security charac-
teristics (40%). This means, if a VM of a customer runs three different
networking applications, on average more than 50 security settings
can be adapted to the setup and its specific properties.
In this context, we introduce the term “custom-made” settings. For
example, the optimal limit for the maximal allowed length of requests
to a Web server varies depending on the type of content a Web server
provides and depending on the tasks it typically processes. Selecting
the same limit for different Web servers of different customers will
not be optimal even if these Web servers are exactly the same appli-
cation – the properties of the target specific setup in which a Web
server operates need to be included in the selection process. By ana-
lyzing characteristics of each Web server’s setup, optimal settings can
be derived. We call these setup-specific optimal settings custom-made
settings.
Moreover, depending on how a setup is changing over time, if new
software is installed or removed, if the number of users or the ways
in which installed applications are used varies, custom-made secu-
rity settings can change over time as well. Maintaining an overview
in this medley of settings is a complex and time-consuming task in
which failures can occur. For example, SSL/TLS misconfiguration at-
tacks have been presented where incorrect settings result in potential
Man-in-the-Middle attacks due to peer hosts not being verified1. Ob-
viously, an automated approach for continuous hardening of applica-
tions seems to be a promising solution.
1 http://www.unrest.ca/peerjacking
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In this section, we present a pro-active security service which au-
tonomously and transparently improves the security settings of ap-
plications running in the VMs of customers. The service retrieves
custom-made settings for each application from the corresponding
setup by analyzing characteristics and properties, for example by in-
vestigating an application’s network traffic or its log files. The service
autonomously deploys these settings into the running application un-
beknownst from the perspective of the VM and without the need
to restart the application. The service can periodically adapt secu-
rity settings and dynamically change them depending on occurred
events or depending on changes in the characteristics of the cus-
tomer’s setup over time. Furthermore, the proposed security service
can also change the settings promptly, depending on different tasks
an application handles. This way, it can continuously provide opti-
mized settings for an application in its unique scenario. We call this
approach “hot-hardening”. In particular, we define hot-hardening as
the continuous and transparent adaptation of security-related configuration
settings of an application depending on properties and characteristics of its
setup. Hot-hardening can be provided as a cloud security service in
an IaaS cloud computing scenario (Section 1.5).
6.2.1 Custom-Made Settings – An Example
Usually, an application comes with default settings stored in a config-
uration file which was created during installation. Suppose an appli-
cation provides a login prompt on the network and only allows Ln
failed login attempts until a connection is terminated and the source
is banned for a fixed period of time. The default setting of Ln is 6 and
the representation of Ln in the application’s source code is an integer
data type that is restricted to allow values in the range of 1 to 16. First,
assume the application runs on server S1 which provides accounts
for a large amount of users and which is not protected by a firewall
which means everyone on the Internet can connect. Second, assume
exactly the same application running on server S2 which provides ac-
counts only for a few users who log-in rarely and S2 is protected by a
firewall only allowing connections from within a sub network. Based
on the properties of S1, a lower value for Ln than the default value
can be recommended for S1, because the occurrence of brute force at-
tacks against the login prompt will be higher.. Furthermore, the larger
amount of user accounts on the system also increases the probability
of some accounts being protected by weak passwords. On the other
hand, the properties of the scenario in which server S2 operates re-
sult in less brute-force attacks because only connection from within
the same network are allowed. Nevertheless, the failed login attempts
can be high, because the users only log-in rarely which means, on av-
erage, they need more attempts because they may have problems to
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remember their passwords. In this case, a higher value for Ln can
be recommended that increases usability without decreasing security.
As shown in this simple example, the same application can have dif-
ferent optimal settings depending on the setup in which it operates.
In this section, we propose a pro-active security service which derives
custom-made settings for applications running in a specific setup and
being subject to unique surroundings and properties.
6.2.2 Related Techniques: Hot-Patching
Hot-patching is an existing technique for transparently updating a tar-
get application’s binary code. Hot-patching was developed in order
to minimize application and server down-times, as it applies patches
to an application during its run-time. In particular, this technique is
of interest when administrators want to deploy regularly released
security patches. Huang et al. [36] developed an autonomous hot
patching framework which can automatically identify the cause of
a failure and patch the binary code of Web-based applications. How-
ever, hot-patching can also be risky since the system can run into
an inconsistent state. To solve the consistency issues, Ramaswamy
et al. [67] proposed a method for hot-patching ELF binaries which
supports synchronized global data. In their work, they used Patch
Objects which are patches encoded as ELF relocatable object files that
can be automatically created and applied to a running process. Payer
et al. [62] developed an update system that provides hot-patching
by integrating dynamic patches with a sandbox based on dynamic
binary translation. In a prototype implementation, they could patch
45 of 49 bugs on the Apache Web server at run-time. On the contrary,
our new proposed technique called hot-hardening focuses on security
settings of applications and not on executable code.
6.2.3 Architecture of the Hot-Hardening Service
In this section, we describe the different techniques used to transpar-
ently change settings of applications during run-time. We introduce
application-dependent hot-hardening templates used by our service
and the strategies for setting improvement.
6.2.3.1 Hot-Hardening Procedure Overview
The proposed security service runs in an isolated and separated VM
equipped with our software. The service is privileged and can ac-
cess the hypervisor layer as well as all the memory addresses on
the physical hardware component. The service runs co-located with
multiple customer VMs and can periodically hot-harden their appli-
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cations with our proposed techniques and strategies. A simplified
overview of a hot-hardening procedure is illustrated in Figure 35.
Figure 35: Simplified overview of the steps in a hot-hardening procedure
performed by the proposed security service.
In the first step, the service discovers the operating system of the
target VM and its running applications. For each operating system,
there is a set of applications that the hot-hardening service can recog-
nize and hot-harden. For supported applications, the service analyzes
the properties and the status of the setup and computes custom-made
settings for that application. In the second step, the service locates
and deploys the new settings to a clone of the target VM in an isolated
environment. This way, the settings can be tested and the execution of
the original target customer VM is not disrupted. In the third step, the
service verifies the correct execution of the application as it runs in the
cloned VM; and finally, in step four, it transparently deploys the new
settings to the original target VM. Because custom-made settings can
change over time, the service repeats the hot-hardening procedure in
certain intervals.
Since retrieving custom-made settings and testing the settings is a
complex task requiring different strategies as well as semantic knowl-
edge about the settings and their characteristics, we equip our service
with application-dependent hot-hardening templates – one template
for every supported application. The service can be equipped with
multiple templates to support various applications. A template needs
to be manually created and defines properties of an application and
characteristics of its settings which are supported for hot-hardening.
For each supported setting, the template defines two modules that
are used by the service: A get-module used to retrieve and compute a
custom-made setting from a setup and a test-module executing steps
of a well-defined strategy in order to test a setting and its effects. The
modules use setting-dependent information transparently retrieved
from a target setup.
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6.2.3.2 Discovery and Hot-Hardening Templates
In the first step, the service investigates which applications are run-
ning on a customer’s VM by transparently examining the file system
on the raw storage (Section 2.5) as well as open ports on the net-
work. For discovery, the service also uses third party tools like the
popular portscanner Nmap2 which offers a database of fingerprints
of more than 2000 well-known services. The service can also trans-
parently locate the executable code (ELF) of running applications in
the customer VM’s volatile memory and compute hashes over this
data for comparison with hashes of know applications in order to dis-
cover applications and their exact versions. If an application could be
discovered for which the service maintains a hot-hardening template,
a hot-hardening procedure is initated. Figure 36 shows an example
template for a fictitious application called mysrv.
The template contains the name and the version of mysrv which
is used to match the right template to a discovered application. The
template provides the path to mysrv’s configuration file located on
the customer VM’s raw storage. The service needs to read the con-
figuration file in order to retrieve mysrv’s currently deployed settings.
Since not all settings of an application are related to security charac-
teristics or suitable for a hot-hardening procedure, they need to be
manually selected and defined in the template. However, some appli-
cations may not be suitable for hot-hardening because they do not
have any settings or they only use settings in their start-up phase and
do not store them or read them again during their operation. For the
fictitious application mysrv, three different settings are supported for
hot-hardening:
• Setting s01 can be set in a range of 0− 100 stepwise changed by
10. The given direction “low” defines that the security charac-
teristics of mysrv increase the lower s01 is set. There is a module
get01.py available that derives a custom-made setting for s01
from a target customer setup. Furthermore, there is a module
test01.py available which can test the effect of s01 in a setup. In
a real application, this setting could be for example a limit on
the number of allowed requests.
• Setting s02 can only be set in a range of 0− 2 stepwise changed
by 1. A lower value is beneficial for the security of mysrv. There
is no module available to derive a custom-made setting for s02
which means the setting is independent from a setup. However
its effect can be tested with the module test02.py. In a real ap-
plication, this setting could be a string, for example defining
the log-level of an application (high, medium, low). Usually, op-
tions which are defined as strings are stored as an integer value
in the application’s volatile memory.
2 http://nmap.org
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<template>
<name>mysrv</name>
<version>1.1b</version>
<config>/etc/example.cfg</config>
<setting name="s01">
<range>0-100</range>
<steps>10</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get01.py</getModule>
<testModule>test01.py</testModule>
</setting>
<setting name="s02">
<range>0-2</range>
<steps>1</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<testModule>test02.py</testModule>
</setting>
<setting name="s03">
<range>1024-4096</range>
<steps>128</steps>
<direction>high</direction>
<getModule>get03.py</getModule>
<testModule>test03.py</testModule>
</setting>
<instruction>s01|0|s03|*|s02</instruction>
<hothard-steps>1,2,3</hothard-steps>
<location>heap</location>
</template>
Figure 36: A Hot-hardening template of a fictitious example application
which we called mysrv.
• Setting s03 has a possible range of 1024− 4096 while it can be
stepwise changed by 128 and higher settings are beneficial for
the security of mysrv. There is a module get03.py that retrieves
the custom-made setting for s03 and a module test03.py that
can test its effect. In a real application, this setting could be for
example the length of a cryptographic key.
In particular, the proposed security service does not just select and
set the best possible (highest or lowest) setting in a hot-hardening
procedure. It uses the get-modules to find the best setting for a spe-
cific customer setup in the allowed range according to the template.
Furthermore, the template defines an instruction how to generate
a pattern which is used to locate the data structure that stores the
currently deployed settings in mysrv’s volatile memory. In this con-
text, the data structure, the order of the stored settings and possible
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content in-between them is important. In order to define an instruc-
tion for pattern generation, manual investigations of the application’s
source code is required. The template defines a memory address re-
gion in mysrv’s memory in which the data structure of the settings
is stored in order to accelerate the localization (in this case heap).
Finally, it defines the different practical steps required in mysrv’s hot-
hardening procedure which are explained in detail in the following
section.
6.2.3.3 Transparent Setting Deployment
Transparently changing settings on a running application is facili-
tated by the underlying virtualization technologies that allow the
service to use different transparent techniques on a customer VM.
First, the service uses active VMI to read and modify a running ap-
plication’s volatile memory (Section 2.4). Second, the service uses live
storage forensics on the VM’s raw storage and this way retrieves data
of stored files. Settings are automatically replaced by the service un-
beknownst from the perspective of the customer VM and without the
need to interrupt an application’s operation. In particular, the service
deploys new settings by executing up to three different steps illus-
trated in Figure 37:
Figure 37: The hot-hardening security service uses three different practical
steps to transparently insert new settings into a customer appli-
cation during run-time.
1. The service locates the configuration file of the application by
transparently examining the file system’s meta data on the cus-
tomer VM’s raw storage. Once the corresponding sectors are
located, the sectors are overwritten with new content having
the same valid structure but containing the new settings. Re-
placing the configuration file on the storage in the first step pre-
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vents automated recovery of old settings once the application is
restarted or during run-time by reloading them from the file.
2. The service locates and replaces a cached copy of the applica-
tion’s configuration file in the operating system’s page cache
with the new content. The page cache helps applications to re-
trieve stored data faster by keeping recently requested data in
the volatile memory. Replacing potentially cached content of the
configuration file prevents automated recovery of old settings.
3. The service locates and replaces the currently used configura-
tion settings in the application’s volatile memory. To reach this
goal, data structure alignment and endianness of the settings
need to be considered. There are a lot of ways in which an ap-
plication can process a configuration file and store its settings in
memory. This depends on the programmed data structure and
on the used data types. Often, settings are summarized and
stored in a struct data type, in some cases settings are stored
independently. However, there are cases in which settings are
not stored in memory and read from the file each time they are
required. In order to locate the settings in memory, the service
uses the instruction of the template to generate a pattern and
searches in the memory region defined in the template.
In same cases, depending on the target application, only the steps
1 and 2 are required, because the application does not store settings
in volatile memory. Sometimes only step 1 is required, because there
is no page cache as well as there are no settings in the application’s
volatile memory. Sometimes only step 3 is required, because there is
no configuration file but there are settings in the application’s mem-
ory fetched from other sources like for example system variables or
command line arguments. The template defines which steps are re-
quired for a specific application’s hot-hardening procedure.
6.2.3.4 Isolated Setting Testing
Changing settings with the help of VMI during an application’s run-
time can lead to interruptions in the application’s operation, unex-
pected results and to misleading entries in log files. In order to avoid
these problems on a customer VM, the service first clones the VM and
deploys and tests the new settings on the clone. Once better working
settings could be found, the service finally deploys them on the orig-
inal customer VM. As introduced in Section 2.3, VM live cloning [81]
is a modified live migration [18] process which creates a synchronous
replica of a target VM during its run-time. The procedure is illus-
trated in Figure 38. A virtual snapshot of the virtual storage of the
customer VM is created and the volatile memory is copied in multi-
ple subsequent iterations.
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Figure 38: The live cloning process triggered by the proposed hot-hardening
security service in order to test new settings on a clone.
If the service changes multiple different settings or settings of dif-
ferent applications on the same customer VM, dependencies of set-
tings can play a role. For example, application A can operate together
with application B and changing a setting of application A can in-
crease their mutual workload which can overload application B.
In order to test new settings and to detect potential unknown de-
pendencies or any other problems, the service evaluates the effect
of each new setting by executing a specific setting dependent test-
module. Each test-module which tests the characteristics of a setting i
returns a numerical result Ri that can deviate from a known theoreti-
cally expected result Rei depending on the currently deployed setting.
If multiple settings are changed, the service first deploys the best set-
tings as defined in the template and tests the effects on the setup. If
the results of the test of a new setting deviates from its expected ef-
fect (Rei − Ri > 0), the service stepwise reduces the setting according
to the defined steps and direction in the application’s hot-hardening
template. In multiple rounds, the service evaluates the tests of all
changed settings and tries to find the best group of settings. This way,
the service can reveal if changing a setting influences the effect of
another setting or if a new setting can not be deployed. The testing
strategy is illustrated in Figure 39. In the first step, the service changes
a single setting and tests the effect of this setting in a second step, but
tests also the effects of all other settings which have not been changed
in a third step. It may happen that an application terminates during
the hot-hardening procedure. In this case, the service creates a new
clone. Once the best working group of settings could be found, the
service terminates the clone and finally deploys the new and tested
settings on the original customer VM.
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Figure 39: The service stepwise revokes the settings by replacing them with
reduced settings once deviations in the effects could be detected.
6.2.4 Dynamic Child Adaptation (DCA)
Up to this stage, our proposed pro-active security service transpar-
ently changes settings, tests the new settings in an isolated environ-
ment (cloned VM) and deploys them on a customer VM. In order
to define the semantics of settings and to allow the service to work
autonomously, we introduced application-depending templates. Fur-
thermore, the proposed security service uses setting-depending mod-
ules to retrieve a custom-made setting by analyzing a target customer
setup and to test the effects of a new setting on a setup. As previ-
ously shown in Figure 35, the proposed service can periodically re-
peat a hot-hardening procedure on the same customer VM and this
way continuously adapt settings which may become suboptimal over
time since the setup or its scenario changed.
However, sometimes it is beneficial to allow the service to dynam-
ically change settings depending on events. In this context, an event
can be a new connection or a new task the application handles. Often,
an application creates temporary child processes to handle different
tasks separately, for example it creates a new child process for each
new network connection. Sometimes, an application also assigns a
data structure of settings to the child processes or it creates a new
child process with its operations depending on currently deployed
settings of the main process. This allows our proposed service to
modify the settings of new child processes separately. The service
can deploy different settings for each new child process depending
on certain events and on properties.
We call this fine-grained and dynamic hot-hardening procedure Dy-
namic Child Adaptation (DCA). In particular, a property of a child
process, for example of the connection it handles, can lead to an
adaptation of the child’s security related settings. If an application
has been hot-hardened once, the service can continuously monitor
the customer VM and adapt certain settings of the application’s child
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processes – if supported. As an illustrative example, we extend the
hot-hardening template of the fictitious application mysrv. We add in-
formation for which settings DCA is supported and which events or
properties lead to which adaptations (Figure 40).
<template>
<name>mysrv</name>
<version>1.1b</version>
<config>/etc/example.cfg</config>
<setting name="s01">
<range>0-100</range>
<steps>10</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get01.py</getModule>
<testModule>test01.py</testModule>
<dca>
<event><src>127.0.0.1</src></event>
<set>100</set>
</dca>
</setting>
...
<setting name="s03">
<range>1024-4096</range>
<steps>128</steps>
<direction>high</direction>
<getModule>get03.py</getModule>
<testModule>test03.py</testModule>
<dca>
<event><src>192.168.0.0/24</src></event>
<set>1024</set>
</dca>
</setting>
...
Figure 40: Extensions to mysrv’s hot-hardening template in order to support
Dynamic Child Adaptation (DCA) for s01 and s03.
The new template allows our service to use DCA for the two set-
tings s01 and s03. Once a child process handles a connection from the
own system, setting s01 is set to 100. Once a child process handles a
connection from the same sub net, setting s03 is set to 1024. This way,
security settings can be relaxed under certain circumstances in order
to increase usability or security characteristics can be dynamically am-
plified. Furthermore, if DCA is used, the settings are directly inserted
into the customer VM without testing them on a clone first. How-
ever, DCA is only supported after an application has already been
hot-hardened, which means changing settings was already tested.
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A DCA procedure which adapts child processes is illustrated in
Figure 41. In this case, a new incoming connection is detected and an-
alyzed by the service before it reaches the customer VM. The service
retrieves the source IP address and several other information from
the new connection. This can be performed since communication is
tunneled through the virtualized network device of the hypervisor
(Section 2.2). If the properties of a new connection match the event
definition in the new extended template, the connection is delayed
until the settings of the application are adapted. After adaptation, the
connection is allowed to proceed and the application now creates a
specially adapted child process. Once the child was created, the ser-
vice immediately revokes the settings in the application back to the
custom-made settings which are effective for other clients. In this con-
text, fine-grained connection management is required.
Figure 41: Subsequent steps in an example Dynamic Child Adaptation
(DCA) hot-hardening procedure.
6.2.5 Evaluation of the Hot-Hardening Service
In an evaluation, we investigate hot-hardening procedures applied to
popular applications and analyze the results. We use a Xen hypervi-
sor setup (Section 2.2) with a Quad CPU (2.67 GHz), 8 GB memory
and a customer VM with 4 GB memory. Both run Ubuntu Linux 12.04
in 64-Bit.
6.2.5.1 Example: Apache2
First, we investigate a hot-hardening procedure for the Apache2 Web
server 2.2. Our Apache2 Web server is a production system hosting
our Web page and giving access to a regularly used SVN reposi-
tory. Without considering any Apache2 extensions, we identified 7
settings of the application which are related to security and which are
suitable for hot-hardening. Apache2’s configuration file is located in
/etc/apache2/apache2.conf. The settings are stored in Apache2’s volatile
memory as a struct data type called server_rec defined in the source
code in include/httpd.h:
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struct server_rec {
...
/** Timeout, before we give up */
apr_interval_time_t timeout;
/** Interval we will wait for another request */
apr_interval_time_t keep_alive_timeout;
/** Maximum requests per connection */
int keep_alive_max;
...
};
By default, Apache2 handles new connections in child processes
which introduces the opportunity to apply DCA.
apache2’s hot-hardening template : A fragment of the hot-
hardening template for Apache2 can be seen in Figure 42. Seven
different settings are supported. Their effects mitigate Brute-Force
attacks, prevent malicious tools to scan for vulnerabilities and mis-
configuration and avoid Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks as well as
the successful execution of exploits (for example based on large or
unusual input). The supported settings are briefly explained in the
following:
• s01 defines the log level (0− 7) and is originally a string (emerg,
alert, crit, ..., info, debug). The template limits the setting to
seven levels 0− 6 which can be changed stepwise by 1 while 6
logs the most (info). Logging more details increases Apache2’s
security characteristics.
• s02 defines the time Apache2 waits to receive a request from
a new connection before terminating it. The template defines a
range of 10−300 seconds for s02which can be stepwise changed
by 10. A low setting increases the security characteristics of
Apache2.
• s03 defines the maximum number of requests allowed during
a persistent connection before Apache2 terminates it. The tem-
plate defines a range of 10 − 100 for s03 that can be stepwise
changed by 2, the lower it is set the better the security charac-
teristics are.
• s04 defines the time for which a connection is maintained for a
next request. The template defines a range of 2− 30 seconds, a
lower value is beneficial for security.
• s05 defines a limit for the size of HTTP request lines in bytes.
The template defines a range of 1024 − 8192 while low is as-
sumed as being better.
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• s06 limits the size of request header fields in bytes and ranges
between 1024− 8192.
• s07 limits the number of header fields in requests. It can be set
in a range of 10− 100.
<template>
...
<setting name="s01">
<range>0-6</range>
<steps>1</steps>
<direction>high</direction>
<testModule>test01.py</testModule>
<dca>
<event><src>192.168.0.0/24</src></event>
<set>1</set>
</dca>
</setting>
...
<setting name="s06">
<range>1024-8192</range>
<steps>512</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get06.py</getModule>
<testModule>test06.py</testModule>
<dca>
<event><src>192.168.0.0/24</src></event>
<set>8192</set>
</dca>
</setting>
...
<instruction>s01|*|s02|0|s04|0|s03|.|s05|0|s06|0|s07</instruction>
<hothard-steps>1,2,3</hothard-steps>
<location>anonymous</location>
</template>
Figure 42: The hot-hardening template of Apache2.
For s01 no get-module is available since this setting is assumed
as being independent from a setup. For the settings s02 to s07, get-
modules are available which can retrieve a custom-made setting from
a setup. The effect of each setting can be tested with a test-module.
The template also defines an instruction how to generate a pattern
in order to locate the currently deployed settings (derived from the
configuration file) in Apache2’s volatile memory. In this context, the
order of the stored settings and the content in-between them (for ex-
ample other settings) is important. This information was previously
derived from the source code. The template defines which practical
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hot-hardening steps are required (Section 6.2.3.3) and the memory
region in which the data structure of the settings is stored. In this
case, it is stored in anonymous mappings created by mmap() with
the MAP_ANONYMOUS flag. The template allows Dynamic Child
Adaptation (DCA) for the settings s01 and s06. Setting s01 is dynam-
ically set to 1 which means less events need to be logged if a client
connects from our sub network. Setting s06 is set to the maximum
of 8192 for clients connecting from our private sub network which al-
lows them to perform longer requests with more header information.
apache2’s hot-hardening modules : The template specifies
six get-modules to retrieve custom-made settings for s2, ..., s7 from
our setup. The computed settings depend on various properties, for
example the workload of our system, other installed applications or
the kind of data our Web server provides. Our Apache2 server hosts
a Web page and a repository (SVN) that can be remotely used by em-
ployees who mostly connect from within our private network. This
is a special property of our setup which actually leads to a frequent
occurrence of multiple GET or PUT requests in a row caused by users
rapidly synchronizing SVN projects consisting of multiple files. The
get-modules compute an average value of events occurring on the
setup which are affected by a setting, they analyze the distribution of
events in log files or they investigate network traffic of the applica-
tion. The get-modules select the best possible value as custom-made
setting according to the definitions of allowed steps and direction in
the template.
• get02.py analyzes network traffic and the timings of new con-
nections and their first request. In our setup, the mean is 2.89±
4.01 seconds which leads to a custom-made setting of 10 sec-
onds (default is 300).
• get03.py analyzes network traffic and investigates the average
number of requests performed per connection (Figure 43). In
our setup, there is a second peak in the distribution caused
by users synchronizing multiple files with our SVN repository.
This is a special property of our setup and leads to a custom-
made setting for the limit of requests per connection of 42 (de-
fault is 100).
• get04.py analyzes timings between multiple request on a persis-
tent connection (Figure 44). It calculates a custom-made setting
of 18 seconds for our setup (default is 30).
• get05.py analyzes the length of requests retrieved from the ac-
cess log file (Figure 45). It calculates a custom-made setting of
1536 bytes for our setup (default is 8190).
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• get06.py analyzes the length of the headers in requests from the
Apache2 log file. It calculates a custom-made setting of 1024
bytes for our setup (default is 8190).
• get07.py analyzes the numbers of fields used in headers in re-
quests. It calculates a custom-made setting of 30 (default is 100).
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Figure 43: Distributions of requests per connection extracted from our setup
by the get-modules which use this data to derive a custom-made
setting for s03 (marked as dotted line).
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Figure 44: Distributions of time between requests [s] extracted from our
setup by the get-modules which use this data to derive a custom-
made setting for s04 (marked as dotted line).
The get-modules consider the special properties of our setup and
derive custom-made settings for Apache2 which increase security
while only minimally affecting our work-flows. The test-modules ac-
tively perform tests on the setup. Each test-module analyzes the effect
of a currently deployed setting. For example, they establish new con-
nections to Apache2 to verify expected timeouts, limits or other char-
acteristics caused by the new settings. In this context, the test-module
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Figure 45: Distributions of length of requests [bytes] extracted from our
setup by the get-modules which use this data to derive a custom-
made setting for s05 (marked as dotted line).
for s01 inspects the information that is logged while it actively per-
forms requests, other test-modules analyze the timeouts for s02 and
s04 while maintaining a connection and the module for s03 tests how
many requests are possible on a persistent connection. The modules
which test s05, s06 and s07 perform different kinds of requests (length
and header fields) to evaluate the corresponding new settings.
apache2’s hot-hardening procedure : In this section, we
investigate the hot-hardening procedure in detail after the custom-
made settings have been computed. First, the service clones the cus-
tomer VM before applying and testing any new settings. In our setup,
live cloning (Section 2.3) of a running VM with 4 GB of memory into
a synchronous replica can be performed in 17± 2 seconds on average.
The timing strongly depends on the current workload of a VM. In
order to reduce the time required for cloning, prepared clones can be
maintained or clones can be created using copy-on-write (CoW) meth-
ods for both volatile memory and storage which enables the creation
of a clone in the range of milliseconds [81].
In the first step, the service identifies the currently deployed set-
tings by locating and reading the corresponding sectors of Apache2’s
configuration file on the raw storage. In general, struct members are
stored in the order they are declared (C99 standard) and if necessary,
padding is added before each struct member to ensure correct align-
ment. Setting s02 and s04 are stored as long data types representing
microseconds. The other settings are stored as integer data types. Fur-
thermore, the order of the byte representation of s02, s04, s05 and s06
has to be adapted according to Little-Endianness. With the help of
the known current settings and the instruction defined in the hot-
hardening template, the service generates a pattern to locate the de-
ployed settings in Apache2’s volatile memory. Table 12 shows the con-
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version procedure of characteristic values. The generated characteris-
tic pattern in hexadecimal representation is 04(.)∗?00a3e111(0)∗?80c3
c901(0)∗?64(0)∗?fe1f(0)∗?fe1f(0)∗?64. It allows padding with zeros
between successive settings and arbitrary content between settings
which have other settings in-between.
Allowed time between a new connection and the
first request of this connection
300 s = 300 ·106µs = 11e1a300
Allowed time for maintaining a connection be-
tween two subsequent requests
30 s = 30 · 106µs = 1c9c380
Allowed length of the HTTP request string in
bytes
8190 bytes = 1ffe
Allowed number of requests per established con-
nection
100 = 64
Table 12: Conversion and computation of settings into hexadecimal repre-
sentation used to locate the corresponding data structure of the
Apache2 settings in the volatile memory.
Retrieving custom-made settings from our setup using the seven
different get-modules takes 121± 4 seconds based on an anonymized
network capture of 62 MB and a log file of 24 MB. Finding the cor-
responding sectors of the configuration file on the storage and re-
placing the content with new content takes only 0.3 ± 0.1 seconds.
Locating and replacing the content of the cached configuration file in
the Linux page cache takes 5.2± 0.9 seconds. Generating the pattern
according to the instructions of the template, locating the data struc-
ture of the settings in Apache2’s volatile memory and replacing the
currently deployed settings with new settings takes 2.4± 0.1 seconds.
Once new settings are deployed, the service executes the setting de-
pendent tests and analyzed the results in order to reveal unexpected
deviations. Evaluating the seven tests takes 46 ± 8 seconds. Finally,
a full hot-hardening procedure for Apache2 takes around 3 minutes
in our setup without any manual interaction. This is a good result
considering that the proposed service performs deep analysis on net-
work traffic and log files and that the it also needs to wait during the
execution of the test-modules in order to verify timeouts.
For DCA, no configuration files need to be replaced. The settings
s01 and s03 are dynamically hot-hardened. Analyzing a new connec-
tion and transparently matching the source IP address to a new child
on the VM via VMI takes 1.4± 0.2 seconds. Hot-hardening of a child
once the triggering properties of a new client could be detected takes
only 2.1±0.1 seconds. Accordingly, a new connection which is the tar-
get for DCA needs to be delayed for approximately 3.5 seconds until
the corresponding child is hot-hardened and operates under specific
settings.
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hot-hardening apache2 with php5 : Apache2 usually runs
in a combination with several extensions. In this section, we introduce
a template for PHP5 hot-hardening and let the service hot-harden
Apache2 and PHP5 on the same setup. Interesting security-related
settings of PHP5 are stored in a struct data type called php_core_globals
defined in the source code in php_globals.h:
struct _php_core_globals {
...
long memory_limit;
long max_input_time;
...
};
The template for PHP5 provides five different settings which are
related to security and supported by our security service:
• s01 defines the maximum amount of memory (MB) a PHP script
can consume (default 128 MB).
• s02 defines the maximum time a PHP script can spend parsing
a request (default 60 seconds).
• s03 defines the maximum size (MB) for uploads (default 2 MB).
• s04 defines the maximum level of nested requests, for example
of an array[][][] (default 64).
• s05 defines the maximum number of GET and POST input vari-
ables (default 1000).
The modules are briefly described in the following: The get-module
of s02 analyzes the timings between requests for PHP scripts and the
resulting replies sent from the server. The get-module of s03 analyzes
the Apache2 log for uploads and their sizes. The get-modules of s04
and s05 analyze the PHP code found in Apache2’s public directory
(default /var/www/) for definitions of nested variables and their depth
and the amount of variables accepted by scripts.
The hot-hardening service retrieves the currently deployed settings
from the configuration file /etc/php5/apache2/php.ini and generates a
pattern according to the instruction given in the PHP5 template while
taking into account data alignment and Little-Endianness. The set-
tings are stored in the anonymously mapped memory region of the li-
brary libphp5.so used by Apache2. The resulting pattern is 0000008(0)
?3C(.)∗?000020(.)∗?40(.)∗?e803.
The service uses the test-modules to evaluate the new settings, in
this case also by creating and inserting PHP code on the clone’s stor-
age. To reach this goal, the service creates specific PHP files in the
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public directory of Apache2 and triggers the execution on the net-
work in order to evaluate the PHP characteristics. The test01.py cre-
ates and evaluates a script that allocates up to 128 MB of memory
when requested, test02.py creates a script that delays its execution
to up to 60 seconds, test03.py creates a script that allows uploading
data of arbitrary size, test04.py creates a script that allocates a nested
array of an arbitrary size and test05.py creates a script that accepts a
defined amount of input variables via a GET request. These tests can
test the characteristics of the PHP5. Execution of the modules could
be performed in 104± 3 seconds and insertion of new custom-made
settings to PHP5 running in the clone while also replacing the stored
configuration file and the file in the page cache could be performed
in 8± 1 seconds. Custom-made settings for PHP5 retrieved from our
setup can be seen in Table 13.
PHP5 setting default setting new setting
s1 128 16
s2 60 6
s3 2048 1536
s4 64 4
s5 1000 25
Table 13: Previous settings and new custom-made settings used in PHP5’s
hot-hardening procedure.
In the first step, Apache2 is hot-hardened and the setting depen-
dent tests are evaluated for both Apache2 and PHP5 according to
the proposed testing strategy. In the second step, the service hot-
hardens PHP5 and again evaluates the tests for both applications.
Since the service evaluates two templates, dependencies can come
into play. For example, during Apache2’s hot-hardening, the evalu-
ation of PHP5 test03.py detected an unusual deviation between the
expected characteristics and the actually measured characteristics on
the setup. PHP5 test03.py evaluates the maximum allowed size for
uploads according to the PHP5 setting s03 which defines 2 MB in
our setup before hot-hardening. After the service changed Apache2
setting s02 which defines the timeout for requests to the new custom-
made setting of 10 seconds, the PHP5 test03.py could not upload a
file of size 2 MB since the new timeout was too low for the upload.
Following the proposed strategy, the service automatically revoked
Apache2 setting s02 and deployed the next possible step defined in
Apache2’s template, which is 20 seconds. However, identifying a de-
pendency between Apache2 setting s02 and PHP5 setting s03 caused
two additional testing rounds which led to a hot-hardening time for
Apache2 of 8 minutes instead of 3 minutes. Dependencies like this
can occur when applications share resources or somehow work to-
gether like in this scenario. However, with the help of the strategy
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and well-defined templates, dependencies can be revealed and set-
tings can be successfully adapted. Finally, hot-hardening of Apache2
and PHP5 took approximately 11 minutes in our setup.
6.2.5.2 Example: OpenSSH2
Finally, we investigate hot-hardening of OpenSSH2 in detail. Our
OpenSSH2 server is a production system having several users who
log in regularly, also using the SCP and sFTP protocol.
openssh2’s hot-hardening template : The configuration set-
tings of OpenSSH2 are stored in a struct data type called ServerOptions
defined in servconf.h. The template for OpenSSH2 can be partially
seen in Figure 46 and supports 8 different security settings.
<template>
...
<setting name="s04">
<range>5-120</range>
<steps>5</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get04.py</getModule>
<testModule>test04.py</testModule>
</setting>
<setting name="s05">
<range>1-6</range>
<steps>1</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get05.py</getModule>
<testModule>test05.py</testModule>
</setting>
<setting name="s06">
<range>0-1</range>
<steps>1</steps>
<direction>low</direction>
<getModule>get06.py</getModule>
<dca>
<event><src>192.168.1.7</src></event>
<set>1</set>
</dca>
</setting>
...
</template>
Figure 46: The hot-hardening template for OpenSSH2.
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The supported settings are briefly explained in the following:
• s01: Size of the key (protocol 1, default 768 bits).
• s02: Time after which the key is regenerated (protocol 1) in sec-
onds (default 3600 seconds).
• s03: Different ciphers which are allowed (protocol 2) (e.g. aes128-
cbc, blowfish-cbc, ...). The template defines three groups classi-
fied by strength.
• s04: The server disconnects after this defined time if the client
has not logged in (default 120 seconds).
• s05: Maximum number of authentication attempts allowed be-
fore the connection is terminated (default 6).
• s06: Specifies if host-based authentication (together with public
key) is allowed (default no).
• s07: Specifies if forwarding of X11 is allowed (default no).
• s08: Specifies if remote root login is allowed (default no).
The template defines the location of the configuration file on the
customer VM’s raw storage and an instruction and region used to
locat settings in OpenSSH2’s volatile memory. The template defines
DCA for the setting s06, s07 and s08. Host-based authentication is
only enabled for a back-up server (192.168.1.7) that daily and auto-
matically transfers data. Accordingly, no other client is allowed to
use host-based authentication. Forwarding of X11 is allowed only for
clients connecting from our private network and remote root login is
only allowed for one host used by the administrator. The OpenSSH2
server is dynamically hot-hardened which allows different settings
under different circumstances which normally could only be stati-
cally deployed for all clients.
openssh2’s hot-hardening modules : The get-modules and
their results in our specific setup are briefly explain in the following:
• get01.py investigates if protocol 1 is supported and which key
size is used by default. It the suggests to use highest setting
(2048).
• get02.py and get03.py investigate the status of the setup and
propose 300 for s02 and 3 for s03, which means only the strongest
cipher algorithms are supported.
• get04.py investigates a network capture and the authentication
log file and analyzes the timings between the establishment of a
new connection and a successful login. In our setup 7.31± 2.76
which leads to a suggested custom-made setting of 10.
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• get05.py analyzes the average number of login attempts remote
users need to successfully log into the system. These are 1.11±
0.39 in our setup which leads to a custom-made setting of 2.
The get-modules get06.py, get07.py and get08.py investigate the sta-
tus and suggest the best setting if feasible. Table 14 shows the com-
puted custom-made settings for our specific setup.
OpenSSH2 setting default setting new setting
s1 768 2048
s2 2600 300
s3 12 4
s4 120 10
s5 6 2
s6 1 0 (1 in DCA)
s7 0 0 (1 in DCA)
s8 0 0 (1 in DCA)
Table 14: Previous default settings and new settings used in OpenSSH2’s
hot-hardening procedure.
openssh2’s hot-hardening procedure : In our test-runs, the
service clones the VM in 16± 4 seconds and uses the get-modules to
retrieve custom-made settings in 47± 5 seconds Finding the sectors
of the OpenSSH2 configuration file and overwriting the data on the
raw storage takes 0.2± 0.3 seconds. Locating and replacing the file’s
cached content in the Linux page cache takes 5.4± 0.8 seconds. Gener-
ating the pattern according to the given instructions, locating the cur-
rently deployed settings in OpenSSH2’s volatile memory and replac-
ing these settings with the new custom-made settings takes 1.9± 0.2
seconds. The testing phase takes only 31.2± 2.2 seconds. Finally, the
hot-hardening procedure of OpenSSH2 could be automatically per-
formed by our proposed hot-hardening service in approximately 1
minute and 42 seconds.
After the hot-hardening procedure is finished, DCA is enabled,
which means the service continuously monitors the customer VM
and dynamically adapts the settings s06, s07 and s08 for new child
processes depending on the IP address of a new client. DCA for
OpenSSH2 can be performed by the service in 2.1±0.2 seconds which
means a new TCP connection establishment to the SSH port needs
only to be delayed for that period of time until it can proceed. Other
connections for which DCA is not enabled are only delayed in the
range of milliseconds. In our scenario, DCA enables specific settings
for our backup server which now can log-in via host-based authenti-
cation while this option is disabled for all other clients. In the same
manner, X11 forwarding and remote root login is only allowed for
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specific clients while maintaining stronger security settings for the
others. DCA allows the definition of more fine-grained settings and
can greatly increase security as well as usability.
6.2.6 Limitations of the Proposed Strategy
As already mentioned, the proposed security service can not hot-
harden every application. Some applications do not store configura-
tion settings in memory or they do not provide any configuration set-
tings. Only applications which store settings in memory and which
also regularly and periodically read and use these settings during
their operation are suitable. Some applications only adapt their op-
eration during the start and do not read the settings again during
their operation. Additionally, not all security settings of an applica-
tion are suitable for hot-hardening – they need to be well-chosen and
defined in the proposed template. Especially, DCA is only applica-
ble if the application assigns the settings to the child processes or
at least adapts the operation of new child processes according to the
settings. Furthermore, there is no guarantee that unknown dependen-
cies of different applications can be detected in every scenario. The
templates need to be well-defined and the security service should
only hot-harden settings which effects can be reliably estimated.
6.3 summary
In this chapter, we first presented a transparent isolation security ser-
vice which secures sensitive data of customer VMs by dynamically
relocating the data to a trusted environment (Section 6.1). Right be-
fore the sensitive data is required, for example by an authentication
procedure of a process, the service temporarily inserts the sensitive
data into the exact location of use. The proposed service only inserts
the data if the integrity of the customer’s operating system could be
verified. Vice versa, once the sensitive data is not longer required,
the service immediately isolates the data again and replaces it with
dummy data. Thus, the sensitive data is only temporarily inserted
into the customer VM’s memory for a very short period of time and
only as long as it is required. This way, our proposed security ser-
vice minimizes the probability of sensitive data being stolen with the
help of attacks which bypass permission mechanisms. An evaluation
showed that our strategy is feasible and can be beneficially deployed
since it operates generically and causes only a small overhead.
Second, we proposed a pro-active security service which actively
optimizes security settings of applications of customers (Section 6.2).
Applying optimized security settings for different applications is a
difficult and time-consuming task. We presented an autonomous se-
curity service that computes custom-made settings for a specific setup
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and periodically improves security settings of different applications
running on customer VMs. We called this strategy hot-hardening. The
service uses transparent techniques in order to modify configuration
files and data structures that store settings in an application’s volatile
memory. The operation of an application is not disturbed as well as
no customer interaction is required. The service supports applications
for which a template is defined and for which setting-dependent mod-
ules are available. Modifying the source code of an application is
not required. Since optimal settings can change over time our service
can periodically analyze the characteristics of a setup and continu-
ously adapt the security settings. In order to support different setting
for different tasks, we introduced Dynamic Child Adaptation (DCA)
which enables the service to rapidly deploy specific settings for new
child processes depending on properties of the task they handle. In
an evaluation, we showed that the service can hot-harden three differ-
ent popular applications (Apache2, PHP5 and OpenSSH2) in feasible
time and can automatically improve their security characteristics.
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C O N C L U S I O N
In this work, we presented different new security architectures for an
IaaS cloud computing scenario (Section 1.4). The proposed security ar-
chitectures can be provided as flexible and scalable services to cloud
customers according to the Security-as-a-Service (SECaaS) business
model (Section 1.5). We used techniques like fine-grained VM intro-
spection (VMI) (Section 2.4), VM live storage forensics ((Section 2.5))
and VM live cloning (Section 2.3) to design and implement our secu-
rity services in a Xen hypervisor setup (Section 2.2). All the proposed
security services operate transparently and run in a tamper-resistant
environment isolated from the systems of the cloud customers (Sec-
tion 2.1). The proposed security services use novel and unique strate-
gies to analyze or modify data transparently retrieved from the hy-
pervisor perspective during run-time.
First, we proposed three different security services in the field of
transparent attack detection (Chapter 4). The first service detects un-
known spreading malicious software by revealing the same propa-
gating effect on an increasing number of different customer systems
within the IaaS cloud network (Section 4.1). The second service de-
tects phishing attacks aiming at customers and executed with the
help of hitherto unknown spoofed web pages. It generates a color-
based fingerprint from information directly retrieved from the raw
volatile memory that is currently used by a browser application dur-
ing its operation. Fingerprints are compared and spoofed web pages
are revealed with the help of human perceptual similarity analysis
(Section 4.2). The third security service detects Man-in-the-Browser
(MitB) attacks by comparing the data of web pages passing the virtu-
alized network device with the data of the web pages processed by a
browser application in the volatile memory of a VM (Section 4.3).
Furthermore, we proposed two different security services in the
field of transparent attack analysis (Chapter 5). The services precisely
analyze ongoing attacks as well as they deceive and misdirect attack-
ers with the help of honeypot-like environments. The first security
service dynamically extracts low-interactive or high-interactive hon-
eypots from customer systems which has the advantage that they run
the same software in exactly the same configuration – but without sen-
sitive data. Attackers can dynamically be redirected or even logged-in
intruders can be extracted “on-the-fly” into isolated systems used for
analysis (Section 5.1). The second security service shows how an at-
tacker can be trapped on the process level by dynamically cloning a
process which is under attack instead of cloning a VM and removing
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sensitive information from the memory of the process (Section 5.2).
By using these security services, cloud customers can learn from at-
tack techniques, reveal vulnerabilities and misconfigurations as well
as reveal the intentions of attackers while their original systems re-
main unaffected.
Finally, we proposed two security services in the field of transpar-
ent attack mitigation that operate in a pro-active fashion (Chapter 6).
The first security service dynamically locates and removes sensitive
data like password hashes or secret keys from a customer VM in or-
der to store this data in a secured environment. The sensitive data is
inserted “on-the-fly” into a running process in the volatile memory
once it is required, only if certain security checks could be verified
and only as long as it is required (Section 6.1). This way, the service
greatly minimizes the probability of sensitive data being stolen by
an attacker who successfully exploits software vulnerabilities on a
customer system in order to bypass permission mechanisms. The sec-
ond proposed security service autonomously analyzes the operating
systems of customers, computes custom-made and optimized secu-
rity settings for each system depending on used software and on the
scenario in which the system runs. New settings are transparently in-
serted into the running processes with the help of different techniques
and without any interruptions. No customer interaction is required.
Optimal settings can change over time and our service can period-
ically analyze a customer setup and adapt the security settings. We
called this strategy “hot-hardening”. Furthermore, we introduced Dy-
namic Child Adaptation (DCA) which enables the proposed service
to rapidly insert specific settings for new child processes depending
on the task they handle.
All our proposed security services have been implemented and
evaluated under realistic circumstances and the results showed the
feasibility of our techniques and strategies. With the help of our novel
services, the security of the customer systems in an IaaS cloud sce-
nario can be greatly increased.
In the near future, cloud computing resources will increasingly be
used by lightweight hardware devices for outsourcing and analyzing
large amounts of data as well as for deploying complex processes. The
continuous progress in the field of software virtualization allows to
provide fine-grained specific computing resources on demand. They
are dynamically and rapidly provided once they are required and for
low costs. Recent progress in the field of memory and storage forensic
techniques and the combination of these techniques with software
virtualization can be beneficially used to transparently analyze co-
resident system deployed in the cloud. In this work, we intensively
used these techniques to locate, interpret and manipulate raw data
extracted from running virtualized systems.
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However, there are a lot of open problems which need to be in-
vestigated and solved. For example, reliable automated approaches
are required that bridge semantic gaps which occur when interpret-
ing unknown extracted raw data. This is necessary to provide flexi-
ble cloud security architectures which support different software se-
tups without the need to have precise previous information about the
customer system’s internals. In this work, we showed several strate-
gies how extracted raw data can be located, analyzed, interpreted
or even manipulated in order to increase the security of customer
systems. However, more sophisticated and generic strategies are re-
quired which can make use out of the extracted information during
run-time, especially regarding to security purposes in multi-tenancy
virtualized environments. Furthermore, there is a lot of potential in
adapting existing security architectures and approaches to the “as-a-
Service” business model. Cloud customers do not want to install or
manage security software or settings, often they do not have the re-
quired expertise as well. Flexible and scalable security services, which
generically support a wide range of different software setups and
which can be simply bought by the customers in addition to other
cloud services have great potential for research as well as for econ-
omy.
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